Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00.txt

"Valery Smyslov" <svanru@gmail.com> Wed, 25 December 2013 05:19 UTC

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Message-ID: <01E73A999255430F803315D676238C09@buildpc>
From: Valery Smyslov <svanru@gmail.com>
To: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, ipsec@ietf.org
References: <C687BD9EA2204F1087D18646766A3C7B@buildpc> <52BA0DEA.8040404@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Dec 2013 09:18:52 +0400
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] Fw: New Version Notification for draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00.txt
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Hi Yaron,

> Hi Valery,
>
> Thanks for posting this draft.
>
> One quick comment: the interaction of your proposal with EAP is not clear 
> to me, i.e. when one peer uses Null auth and the other uses EAP. There are 
> cases where this should be forbidden (e.g. MSCHAP, where the 
> unauthenticated peer can mount a dictionary attack) and other cases where 
> this is OK. Specifically, for the methods listed as "safe" in Sec. 4 of 
> RFC 5998, I believe this use would be secure.

Actually, I think that NULL Auth should not be used with EAP.
Section 2.16 of RFC5996 states:

   In addition to authentication using public key signatures and shared
   secrets, IKE supports authentication using methods defined in RFC
   3748 [EAP].  Typically, these methods are asymmetric (designed for a
   user authenticating to a server), and they may not be mutual.  For
   this reason, these protocols are typically used to authenticate the
   initiator to the responder and MUST be used in conjunction with a
   public-key-signature-based authentication of the responder to the
   initiator.

I agree with you, that in some cases using NULL Auth with EAP
might be secure, but as IKEv2 already requires responder
to use signature auth with EAP, I don't see any reason to change it.

Do you think it's worth to mention that in the draft and provide
a reference to the text from RFC5996?

> Happy holidays!

> Yaron

Happy New Year!

Valery.

> On 12/24/2013 03:47 PM, Valery Smyslov wrote:
>> Hi all,
>>
>> I've just posted a draft, defining NULL Authentication method in IKEv2.
>> This method may be used for anonymous access or in situations,
>> when peers don't have any trust relationship, but still want
>> to get protection at least against passive attacks.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Valery.
>>
>>
>> ----- Original Message ----- From: <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>> To: "Valery Smyslov" <svan@elvis.ru>; "Valery Smyslov" <svan@elvis.ru>
>> Sent: Tuesday, December 24, 2013 5:40 PM
>> Subject: New Version Notification for
>> draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00.txt
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Valery Smyslov and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name: draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth
>> Revision: 00
>> Title: The NULL Authentication Method in IKEv2 Protocol
>> Document date: 2013-12-24
>> Group: Individual Submission
>> Pages: 8
>> URL:
>> http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00.txt
>>
>> Status:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth/
>> Htmlized:
>> http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-smyslov-ipsecme-ikev2-null-auth-00
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document defines the NULL Authentication Method for IKEv2
>>    Protocol.  This method provides a way to omit peer authentication in
>>    IKEv2 and to explicitely indicate it in the protocol run.  This
>>    method may be used to preserve anonymity or in situations, where no
>>    trust relationship exists between the parties.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
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