Re: [IPsec] [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09.txt> (Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2) to Proposed Standard

"Paul Hoffman" <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> Wed, 11 December 2019 18:03 UTC

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From: Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org>
To: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
Cc: last-call@ietf.org, ipsec@ietf.org, Kenny Paterson <Kenny.Paterson@rhul.ac.uk>
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2019 10:03:47 -0800
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Subject: Re: [IPsec] [Last-Call] Last Call: <draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-09.txt> (Postquantum Preshared Keys for IKEv2) to Proposed Standard
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On 11 Dec 2019, at 8:23, Salz, Rich wrote:

> We are seeing a flurry of these kind of “post quantum protection” 
> things.

This is the only one I have seen that is a method, not a new key 
exchange algorithm. It is understandable that you could have missed this 
from the title which misstates the topic. A much better title would be 
"Mixing Preshared Keys in IKEv2 for Postquantum Resistance".

> This is premature.

Disagree. The method described in the document has been well-discussed 
in the IPsecME for years, getting good cryptographic review.

> The co-chair of the CFRG, Kenny Paterson, said so awhile back.

I don't think that's what he said in the slides you posted, but I've 
Cc'd him so he can reply. The slides are about picking new post-quantum 
algorithms; what is described in the draft is a method for mixing in 
preshared secrets with current algorithms.

--Paul Hoffman