Re: [IPsec] AD review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-08

Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru> Wed, 13 November 2019 08:36 UTC

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From: Valery Smyslov <svan@elvis.ru>
To: 'Tero Kivinen' <kivinen@iki.fi>, 'Paul Wouters' <paul@nohats.ca>
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Date: Wed, 13 Nov 2019 11:36:27 +0300
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/ipsec/fblt4OSmhLuvIqzdAzAkTegX5fQ>
Subject: Re: [IPsec] AD review of draft-ietf-ipsecme-qr-ikev2-08
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Hi Tero,

> > > Do you think the current diagrams are confusing?
> >
> > Yes. Because often I go back to RFCs and only look at the diagrams
> > expecting it to be what I need to implement. So for optional/required
> > payloads, I would mostly look at the diagram, and perhaps read a bit
> > of text.
> 
> That is the reason we added Appendix C in the IKEv2.
> 
> So my proposal is to leave the exchanges inside the text as they are,
> but add new Appendix that has the different exchanges including the
> optional payloads.

I don't think it's justified for such small changes in IKE exchanges
(a couple new notifications). Instead, I suggest to add the following
short clarification after the picture:

      Initiator                         Responder
      ----------------------------------------------------------------
      HDR, SK {IDi, [CERTREQ,]
          [IDr,] SAi2,
          TSi, TSr}  -->
                                   <--  HDR, SK {IDr, [CERT,] AUTH,
                                            EAP}
      HDR, SK {EAP}  -->
                                   <--  HDR, SK {EAP (success)}
      HDR, SK {AUTH,
          N(PPK_IDENTITY, PPK_ID)
          [, N(NO_PPK_AUTH)]}  -->
                                   <--  HDR, SK {AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr
                                        [, N(PPK_IDENTITY)]}

   Note, that the diagram above shows both the cases when the responder
   uses PPK and when it chooses not to do it (provided the initiator has
   included NO_PPK_AUTH notification), so the responder's PPK_IDENTITY
   notification is marked as optional.  

Is it OK? Paul?

Regards,
Valery.