[IPsec] test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED derivation
Michael Richardson <mcr@sandelman.ca> Wed, 14 November 2007 05:34 UTC
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Subject: [IPsec] test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED derivation
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I'm looking for some test vectors for SKEYSEED calculation. I asked google a bit, but I didn't find anything published on the IPsec list. Perhaps there are some materials from one of the bakeoffs. I wish that we had put some vectors into rfc4306. I saw that there are some vectors in the SHA256 drafts, but I don't think that they give enough detail to confirm that an implementation has done the right thing. Obviously, I'm going to try interoperating, but it isn't always easy to find the error in the calculation when looking a black box. If someone would be willing the confirm my calculations, my inputs and output are listed below, or in C-hex files at: http://git.openswan.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=openswan.git;a=blob;f=testing/lib/libpluto/seam_gi.c;h=cfaa33012e3e3506e7cf62f5a64a7ca6b51d7a98;hb=7a2a3bf55fc19df377e78ea61673d74656ece8b0 http://git.openswan.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=openswan.git;a=blob;f=testing/lib/libpluto/seam_gi_sha1.c;h=e980dabd5cc17b3f12b56085ac7f09eccf60f861;hb=9d417f4bb2ebb4333dda6e228e7bc0eae834f61a For instance, this is my calculation with MD5 as the PRF, HMAC-MD5 as the intended auth and 3DES as the intended cipher for the PARENT_SA. (I.e. 128 bits required for SK_a and SK_p, and 192 bits for SK_e). (THESE ARE NOT CONFIRMED!!!) | spii 75 46 d3 d6 ea 09 f7 df | spir 61 a6 78 6a 41 ea 48 06 | ni b5 ce 84 19 09 5c 6e 2b 6b 62 d3 05 53 05 b3 c4 | nr 47 e9 f9 25 8c a2 38 58 f6 75 b1 66 b0 2c c2 92 | gi ff bc 6a 92 a6 b9 55 9b 05 fa 96 a7 a4 35 07 b4 | c1 e1 c0 86 1a 58 71 d9 ba 73 a1 63 11 37 88 c0 | de bb 39 79 e7 ff 0c 52 b4 ce 60 50 eb 05 36 9e | a4 30 0d 2b ff 3b 1b 29 9f 3b 80 2c cb 13 31 8c | 2a b9 e3 b5 62 7c b4 b3 5e b9 39 98 20 76 b5 7c | 05 0d 7b 35 c3 c5 c7 cc 8c 0f ea b7 b6 4a 7d 7b | 6b 8f 6b 4d ab f4 ac 40 6d d2 01 26 b9 0a 98 ac | 76 6e fa 37 a7 89 0c 43 94 ff 9a 77 61 5b 58 f5 | 2d 65 1b bf a5 8d 2a 54 9a f8 b0 1a a4 bc a3 d7 | 62 42 66 63 b1 55 d4 eb da 9f 60 a6 a1 35 73 e6 | a8 88 13 5c dc 67 3d d4 83 02 99 03 f3 a9 0e ca | 23 e1 ec 1e 27 03 31 b2 d0 50 f4 f7 58 f4 99 27 | gr cd 30 df 6e c0 85 44 12 53 01 80 d8 7e 1a fb b3 | 26 79 3e 99 56 c8 6a 96 25 53 c2 77 ad 5b ab 50 | f8 32 5a d8 64 0b 0e fe a5 1d 6c 83 1f a1 7c fb | 0f 2e 1a f4 b1 66 a0 fe 30 75 12 ad 0f 81 ab b8 | aa fb 68 48 ec 10 a4 97 6c 3d b1 17 ec e1 e6 61 | db bf 48 0c 28 2e 3f 11 07 c1 86 42 80 1e e8 3f | 9e 4a b9 ab 63 6f 23 7d aa f6 a7 aa d8 22 99 3e | a4 1e a3 31 ee 27 82 0b 93 f5 0b 8f 3f 71 05 61 | c9 25 70 26 97 ba 6b 1e 95 3c 21 fb c9 a7 7d 2b | 5f 87 3c fc 50 99 e7 7d 48 4c dd 52 66 4b cf 0d | bf 00 ca fd ae 6d e7 14 6d 11 35 f6 5d 93 5f 60 | b9 73 0f e0 49 2c 2a f8 c9 04 f6 4c 59 16 90 9d | secret 17 9b b3 22 a6 77 6f bc 01 4e 41 03 f0 f6 2e 93 | fb 07 d0 93 84 57 e4 54 1e 64 46 a9 34 37 c0 9d | DH calculation gives: | c2 e9 1d a2 05 63 19 6e 34 89 df d1 af a5 4a 51 | 09 4d 76 2e ff bf 39 a6 1a 64 f4 8c 8e fb 0a 4f | ac 5a a3 18 01 aa 1a cc 94 d6 91 50 96 38 16 8b | dd 39 19 c3 5e 99 5a 92 3d e3 fa 2c 2d 21 cb 15 | ac 7a 81 49 ab 37 33 f7 55 a3 25 a0 90 4a 87 bb | fe 70 71 8b 63 ba af 56 a7 b4 8f 54 d5 0d 17 95 | 14 f3 09 21 da d6 8c 71 8c d4 82 89 06 c4 24 75 | 4b 55 4c d9 91 83 ce b6 ad ae 6a 5e 7d bf f9 ef | ae 60 a7 b7 97 b6 31 50 4e cc 0f ff 17 f1 aa 4b | 1e 0c 61 71 32 d6 b9 79 58 61 e6 ab f3 67 d8 9e | 3c db 68 3e ff 9e 37 ea 67 70 21 0e 07 ea b6 2b | 72 30 ea 5d 55 86 9a 04 86 ed e1 c7 bd ee 61 84 | skeyseed: 35 8e b1 84 d9 02 7e a2 a3 b3 e6 08 b9 2f 5f bf | prf+[1]: 52 9a 10 2f 28 df 41 78 6e c2 75 e1 06 3b d2 50 | prf+[2]: 3e 43 b9 a8 f8 4e b0 2b a1 be 33 6f 4a 37 da 21 | prf+[3]: ba 4e fe 1c f0 0a 4d b0 22 02 5d 4f 53 b9 56 45 | prf+[4]: 50 a9 46 72 7a af fb 5d 8f 85 21 d4 88 eb 84 ec | prf+[5]: 72 87 28 fe b0 6a 22 c2 83 c5 c2 82 bb f7 d5 b7 | prf+[6]: 7a dc 9f 0b 1d 32 11 cc 90 22 79 2c 20 b4 93 d6 | prf+[7]: 18 01 15 e0 86 ce d3 95 6b 1a b1 f7 7b bb 6f 2d | prf+[8]: c0 47 bc 10 1f d5 b0 e9 b2 9f 74 93 2a 8e c4 3a | SK_d: 52 9a 10 2f 28 df 41 78 6e c2 75 e1 06 3b d2 50 | SK_ai: 3e 43 b9 a8 f8 4e b0 2b a1 be 33 6f 4a 37 da 21 | SK_ar: ba 4e fe 1c f0 0a 4d b0 22 02 5d 4f 53 b9 56 45 | SK_ei: 50 a9 46 72 7a af fb 5d 8f 85 21 d4 88 eb 84 ec | 72 87 28 fe b0 6a 22 c2 | SK_er: 83 c5 c2 82 bb f7 d5 b7 7a dc 9f 0b 1d 32 11 cc | 90 22 79 2c 20 b4 93 d6 | SK_pi: 18 01 15 e0 86 ce d3 95 6b 1a b1 f7 7b bb 6f 2d | SK_pr: c0 47 bc 10 1f d5 b0 e9 b2 9f 74 93 2a 8e c4 3a And for AES128 and SHA1: | spii 75 46 d3 d6 ea 09 f7 df | spir 61 a6 78 6a 41 ea 48 06 | ni b5 ce 84 19 09 5c 6e 2b 6b 62 d3 05 53 05 b3 c4 | nr 47 e9 f9 25 8c a2 38 58 f6 75 b1 66 b0 2c c2 92 | gi ff bc 6a 92 a6 b9 55 9b 05 fa 96 a7 a4 35 07 b4 | c1 e1 c0 86 1a 58 71 d9 ba 73 a1 63 11 37 88 c0 | de bb 39 79 e7 ff 0c 52 b4 ce 60 50 eb 05 36 9e | a4 30 0d 2b ff 3b 1b 29 9f 3b 80 2c cb 13 31 8c | 2a b9 e3 b5 62 7c b4 b3 5e b9 39 98 20 76 b5 7c | 05 0d 7b 35 c3 c5 c7 cc 8c 0f ea b7 b6 4a 7d 7b | 6b 8f 6b 4d ab f4 ac 40 6d d2 01 26 b9 0a 98 ac | 76 6e fa 37 a7 89 0c 43 94 ff 9a 77 61 5b 58 f5 | 2d 65 1b bf a5 8d 2a 54 9a f8 b0 1a a4 bc a3 d7 | 62 42 66 63 b1 55 d4 eb da 9f 60 a6 a1 35 73 e6 | a8 88 13 5c dc 67 3d d4 83 02 99 03 f3 a9 0e ca | 23 e1 ec 1e 27 03 31 b2 d0 50 f4 f7 58 f4 99 27 | gr cd 30 df 6e c0 85 44 12 53 01 80 d8 7e 1a fb b3 | 26 79 3e 99 56 c8 6a 96 25 53 c2 77 ad 5b ab 50 | f8 32 5a d8 64 0b 0e fe a5 1d 6c 83 1f a1 7c fb | 0f 2e 1a f4 b1 66 a0 fe 30 75 12 ad 0f 81 ab b8 | aa fb 68 48 ec 10 a4 97 6c 3d b1 17 ec e1 e6 61 | db bf 48 0c 28 2e 3f 11 07 c1 86 42 80 1e e8 3f | 9e 4a b9 ab 63 6f 23 7d aa f6 a7 aa d8 22 99 3e | a4 1e a3 31 ee 27 82 0b 93 f5 0b 8f 3f 71 05 61 | c9 25 70 26 97 ba 6b 1e 95 3c 21 fb c9 a7 7d 2b | 5f 87 3c fc 50 99 e7 7d 48 4c dd 52 66 4b cf 0d | bf 00 ca fd ae 6d e7 14 6d 11 35 f6 5d 93 5f 60 | b9 73 0f e0 49 2c 2a f8 c9 04 f6 4c 59 16 90 9d | secret 17 9b b3 22 a6 ab cd ef 01 4e 41 03 f2 f6 2e 93 | fb 07 d4 93 84 57 e4 54 1e 64 46 a9 34 37 c4 9d | DH calculation gives: | 60 76 62 71 0c 76 fe 27 4f 6f 7c 9f 68 cf cf e0 | a7 56 44 cb a1 92 2a b9 c9 c2 16 0e a7 80 d0 71 | 50 06 87 10 85 f0 80 30 58 c4 2e c9 d6 ae 4f 53 | 41 b6 2b 7c 66 8d 9f ba 20 15 5a 7c 23 60 e6 22 | 03 55 a0 80 3b c9 11 a5 6f c7 30 0d d7 f6 6b 01 | c4 88 ab 8f 79 1a d2 cc 58 8d 28 c0 c0 78 fa 61 | 21 d5 88 1b 3a e9 b4 a7 d8 c9 a6 58 60 6e 0a 2a | 5e 9c 5f 9e c2 b5 0b 63 d7 af bb 80 f4 a4 83 37 | ce de f5 aa 6f a1 a0 f3 af c3 21 47 19 2c 7f ba | 7e 27 9f 00 28 81 21 cb 3d e7 f1 d9 76 fd f1 6c | 99 28 db 95 92 38 f7 83 a4 fd 38 75 7e 55 2c e9 | 2d db d6 f5 0c 1d 35 af 77 34 fc 85 cb 30 b8 09 | skeyseed: 9d 8e 53 96 0b 36 01 f4 c0 d3 29 ee 1e c3 70 27 | 0d 06 22 17 | prf+[1]: ac 97 eb 39 07 53 a4 5d 61 c1 64 ff ca 25 99 b0 | 2e 05 3c 7e | prf+[2]: 4e a8 e6 62 b0 7c dd 43 0f 69 44 c6 72 3e 4b 82 | d5 72 24 18 | prf+[3]: 51 5b 0b d2 2e 6d 76 b3 4f db 76 0a a7 bf ad 80 | b1 09 b7 5d | prf+[4]: 3f 44 bf 47 ca fd 81 50 59 1d eb 08 81 99 fc bf | be db 67 ec | prf+[5]: 7d c3 d0 0c cc ac 42 e7 0c d6 3b de cc 07 97 44 | b4 a3 4e 8a | prf+[6]: 0d 2f 27 8b ee 06 6d 07 a5 a5 75 2e e9 00 11 7e | 41 d4 31 62 | prf+[7]: 40 b8 63 22 bf 06 9f bc eb 81 58 e7 6a 49 14 75 | 56 d3 3c 8e | SK_d: ac 97 eb 39 07 53 a4 5d 61 c1 64 ff ca 25 99 b0 | 2e 05 3c 7e | SK_ai: 4e a8 e6 62 b0 7c dd 43 0f 69 44 c6 72 3e 4b 82 | d5 72 24 18 | SK_ar: 51 5b 0b d2 2e 6d 76 b3 4f db 76 0a a7 bf ad 80 | b1 09 b7 5d | SK_ei: 3f 44 bf 47 ca fd 81 50 59 1d eb 08 81 99 fc bf | SK_er: be db 67 ec 7d c3 d0 0c cc ac 42 e7 0c d6 3b de | SK_pi: cc 07 97 44 b4 a3 4e 8a 0d 2f 27 8b ee 06 6d 07 | a5 a5 75 2e | SK_pr: e9 00 11 7e 41 d4 31 62 40 b8 63 22 bf 06 9f bc | eb 81 58 e7 _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list IPsec@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
- [IPsec] test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED derivation Michael Richardson
- Re: [IPsec] test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED deriv… Scott G. Kelly
- [IPsec] Re: test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED deriv… Michael Richardson
- [IPsec] Re: test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED deriv… Tero Kivinen
- [IPsec] Re: test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED deriv… Michael Richardson
- [IPsec] Re: test vectors for IKEv2 SKEYSEED deriv… Tero Kivinen