Re: Questions from the Authors of draft-gashinsky-v6nd-enhance

Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> Sun, 07 August 2011 22:12 UTC

Return-Path: <joelja@bogus.com>
X-Original-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 16DFE21F87BC for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 7 Aug 2011 15:12:29 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -101.999
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-101.999 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-2.599, J_CHICKENPOX_13=0.6, USER_IN_WHITELIST=-100]
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([12.22.58.30]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 7mD+uPFwDwwX for <ipv6@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 7 Aug 2011 15:12:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from nagasaki.bogus.com (nagasaki.bogus.com [IPv6:2001:418:1::81]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9AC7F21F86FF for <ipv6@ietf.org>; Sun, 7 Aug 2011 15:12:28 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [192.168.1.171] (c-98-234-216-143.hsd1.ca.comcast.net [98.234.216.143]) (authenticated bits=0) by nagasaki.bogus.com (8.14.4/8.14.4) with ESMTP id p77MCgwX071848 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES128-SHA bits=128 verify=NOT); Sun, 7 Aug 2011 22:12:43 GMT (envelope-from joelja@bogus.com)
Subject: Re: Questions from the Authors of draft-gashinsky-v6nd-enhance
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v1084)
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
From: Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com>
In-Reply-To: <20110808072814.10ca9bec@opy.nosense.org>
Date: Sun, 07 Aug 2011 15:12:42 -0700
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
Message-Id: <E22AA241-ADAD-41BB-AAC8-74168255F0CF@bogus.com>
References: <4CF32C15-36D0-4287-8573-ABF750F8BB08@bogus.com> <20110808072814.10ca9bec@opy.nosense.org>
To: Mark Smith <ipng@69706e6720323030352d30312d31340a.nosense.org>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1084)
X-Greylist: Sender succeeded SMTP AUTH, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.2.7 (nagasaki.bogus.com [147.28.0.81]); Sun, 07 Aug 2011 22:12:43 +0000 (UTC)
Cc: ipv6@ietf.org
X-BeenThere: ipv6@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12
Precedence: list
List-Id: "IPv6 Maintenance Working Group \(6man\)" <ipv6.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/ipv6>
List-Post: <mailto:ipv6@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6>, <mailto:ipv6-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Sun, 07 Aug 2011 22:12:29 -0000

Thanks!

On Aug 7, 2011, at 2:58 PM, Mark Smith wrote:

> Hi Joel,
> 
> I've been and am in the middle of starting a new job and moving
> inter-state over the last few weeks, so I haven't been able to spend as
> much time on this as I'd have liked to, as I'm quite interested in this
> issue being resolved. I haven't had a chance, and won't over the next
> few weeks to thoroughly read the draft, hopefully below is useful.
> 
> I have been working on my own proposal to address this issue by
> abandoning the state held during the NS/NA transaction, and relying on
> the traffic originating hosts to retransmit their NS/NA triggering
> traffic if the stateless NS/NA transaction fails.
> 
> On Sun, 7 Aug 2011 10:57:45 -0700
> Joel Jaeggli <joelja@bogus.com> wrote:
> 
>> Greetings,
>> 
>> This is followup from our discussion in both v6ops and 6man. We got a lot of useful input, but I would like to ask the mailing list to see if we can solidify this into a course of action.
>> 
>> For reference:
>> 
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-gashinsky-v6nd-enhance-00.txt
>> 
>> http://tools.ietf.org/agenda/81/slides/6man-9.pdf
>> 
>> 
>> 1. Is this document (draft-gashinsky-v6nd-enhance) worthwhile?
>> 
> 
> Yes
> 
>> 2. Is there critique of the two proposed 4861 changes?
>> 
>> 	A. 7.3  NDP Protocol Gratuitous NA
>> 
>> 		a. We believe the is the question is whether the technique would 
>> 		be useful under duress, wether it is potentially dangerous,
>> 		if the safeguards are adequate, etc.
>> 
>> 	B. 7.4 ND cache priming and refresh
>> 
> 
> Haven't had the chance to thoroughly understand them yet.
> 
>> 3. Should we separate the potential mitigations (section 6) and implementation advice (section 7.1 and 7.2) into a separate document.
> 
> Yes. 
> 
>> 
>> 	A. Assumption (validated in v6ops at ietf81) is that v6ops would be happy
>> 	 to take the mitigation and implementation advice as an informational document
>> 
>> 	B. Assumption 2 a draft updating 4861 would be a standards track document.
>> 
>> 	C. Assumption 3, should harmonize with  draft-nordmark-6man-impatient-nud-00
>> 
>> 4. Is there anyone who thinks that an update to 4861 to address dos exposure is unnecessary?
>> 
> 
> I think this issue is essential to address. The end-users of the
> Internet, and the services/applications they use, usually reside on
> LANs, and LANs are vulnerable to this attack. The /127 or similar
> techniques aren't applicable to LANs or point-to-point links such as SP
> residential subscriber PPP/PPPoE sessions. A general method to resolve
> this issue for all links, regardless of their role in the network or
> their type should be the goal.
> 
>> 	A. Just publish the advice and be done with it?
>> 
>> Comments on some or all of these questions would help the authors decide where to go next.
>> 
>> Thanks
>> Joel
> 
> HTH,
> Mark.
>