Re: [keyassure] TLSA record does not mandate the given certificate

[Zack Weinberg <[e-mail]>]

On Mon, Mar 28, 2011 at 12:34 PM, Michael Richardson <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> {I think you should start three threads for your three proposals}

It is one proposal.  I could split out the additional text about
non-security use, but apart from that, it doesn't make sense to try to
break up the changes.

> I can't parse "yes"/"no" in the above sentence.
> Do you mean:
>
>  A TLSA record for site S specifying certificate X forbids a compliant
>  client from proceeding with the handshake if it receives certificate Y.
>
> or do you mean to object to this statement?  I think you mean to support
> it but I couldn't tell from the overview, and only from the text you supplied.

I mean to support it.  This is meant to be clear from this text of the proposal:

>    Zack> The presence in the DNS of a trusted TLSA record is an assertion
>    Zack> by the zone administrator that the legitimate server(s) for that
>    Zack> host, protocol, and port will use certificate bundles that can be
>    Zack> associated with the domain name by that record (as defined in
>    Zack> section 3.1), and no others.
>
>    Zack> Therefore, a DANE client in possession of a trusted TLSA record
>    Zack> for a server MUST determine whether that TLSA record associates
>    Zack> the server's domain name with the certificate bundle it provides
>    Zack> in the TLS handshake.  If it does not, a DANE client MUST reject
>    Zack> the end-entity certificate and abort the TLS handshake with an
>    Zack> "access_denied" error.  This rule applies even if the end-entity
>    Zack> certificate would have been trusted in the absence of the TLSA
>    Zack> record.

If it's not, please let me know how I could improve it.

zw