Re: [keyassure] Interpreting certificates (and summary)

Which is a profile of X.509 V3:

This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate
   revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet.  An overview of this
   approach and model is provided as an introduction.  The X.509 v3
   certificate format is described in detail, with additional
   information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name
   forms.  Standard certificate extensions are described and two
   Internet-specific extensions are defined.

It is pretty important to specify the version number since we are going to
need to revisit the format in the next 40 years as the date field was
botched.

On Wed, Feb 23, 2011 at 5:01 PM, Paul Hoffman <paul.hoffman@vpnc.org> wrote:

> On 2/23/11 1:03 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
>
>> Could we short-circuit this entire argument by deferring to the
>> protocol being secured for the certificate format?  Concretely,
>> wording like
>>
>>       [...] The types defined in this document are:
>>
>>          1 -- An end-entity certificate, in the wire format used by
>> the protocol being secured
>>          2 -- A certification authority's certificate, ditto
>>
>
> The WG already agreed that "the protocol being secured" is TLS, as the
> current draft states. TLS has exactly one certificate type: PKIX
> certificates in the format given in RFC 5280. (There is a
> non-standards-track extension to allow OpenPGP certificates.)
>
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