Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementation/spec variance
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU> Thu, 12 December 2013 00:14 UTC
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Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 19:14:28 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@MIT.EDU>
To: Greg Hudson <ghudson@MIT.EDU>
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Cc: kitten@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementation/spec variance
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On Wed, 11 Dec 2013, Greg Hudson wrote: > Has anyone else run across this variance? If all implementations begin > at 00 00 00 00, then this is similar to the KeyExchange vs. KEYEXCHANGE > issue with RFC 6112: the constants involved are arbitrary and it would > be more painful to change the implementations than the spec. Meaning that we should submit an erratum and accordingly get told to re-issue the document? -Ben
- [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementation/sp… Greg Hudson
- Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementatio… Jeffrey Hutzelman
- Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementatio… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementatio… Nico Williams
- Re: [kitten] krb5 gss_pseudo_random implementatio… Greg Hudson