Re: [kitten] Checking the transited list of a kerberos ticket in a transitive cross-realm trust situation...

Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> Thu, 24 August 2017 17:36 UTC

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From: Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com>
To: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>, Greg Hudson <ghudson@mit.edu>, heimdal-discuss@h5l.org, "krbdev@mit.edu Dev List" <krbdev@mit.edu>, "kitten@ietf.org" <kitten@ietf.org>, Samba Technical <samba-technical@lists.samba.org>
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 13:36:29 -0400
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Subject: Re: [kitten] Checking the transited list of a kerberos ticket in a transitive cross-realm trust situation...
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On Thu, 2017-08-24 at 15:11 +0200, Stefan Metzmacher wrote:
> Hi Simo,
> 
> > > I guess the proposed credential option is necessary, in that
> > > case.
> > > 
> > 
> > I think in this case ignoring the flag should probably be
> > conditional
> > to whether a PAC is present.
> 
> We should enforce a PAC always to be present, as we don't support
> trusted domains with LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT anyway.

In samba, yes, but that option can be used in other clients that can
connect to multiple types of servers so in case they do not get a PAC
the flag should be respected.

Simo.

-- 
Simo Sorce
Sr. Principal Software Engineer
Red Hat, Inc