IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [kitten] Checking the transited list of a kerberos ticket in a transitive cross-realm trust situation...

Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org> Thu, 24 August 2017 22:29 UTC

Return-Path: <metze@samba.org>
X-Original-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: kitten@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 863A7132719 for <kitten@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 24 Aug 2017 15:29:41 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -2.001
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.001 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=samba.org
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id iRwK9frudYZp for <kitten@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 24 Aug 2017 15:29:39 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from hr2.samba.org (hr2.samba.org [IPv6:2a01:4f8:192:486::147:1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7D77A13219C for <kitten@ietf.org>; Thu, 24 Aug 2017 15:29:39 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=samba.org; s=42627210; h=Date:Message-ID:From:To:CC; bh=EZHamunlB2pZGuxuPreynrYT2veV+d2whupHPlCJjzc=; b=J3aRvotRqHg2RXEL08zP9oFZJf DVEUN7uxnKdufySqzOjBNJBKKV8CBBiNA/H4znrlurXXM6CY95EvQM6+rZW1KgQrfDXknZtcdIgPK nOXwVK3BARVjIio2/TN1EuXqLyAlpXc0mNld6Tgx2+DffycDVaP8lqISP/M6li/UzsMQ=;
Received: from [127.0.0.2] (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by hr2.samba.org with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_CHACHA20_POLY1305:256) (Exim) id 1dl0d3-0002Lu-99; Thu, 24 Aug 2017 22:29:33 +0000
To: kitten@ietf.org, Viktor Dukhovni <viktor1dane@dukhovni.org>, Samba Technical <samba-technical@lists.samba.org>
References: <f33d5f68-1fdc-c1bc-c702-70b054880bb4@samba.org> <649fa812-aacf-80b6-1976-a719eca60fc2@mit.edu> <33c431f5-c36b-c321-de3f-65977d8aa898@samba.org> <007c29e8-02b9-4f48-f67e-881cb0985d64@mit.edu> <69d80d24-d461-1652-3cfb-e55d90d31fbf@samba.org> <ec067a72-313e-1878-33a0-a3259d2979d5@mit.edu> <1503578184.3428.19.camel@redhat.com> <db882372-aa1d-e58e-4c94-a268539bd2ee@samba.org> <1503596189.3428.26.camel@redhat.com> <F363B51E-FDF7-4C91-9ABD-B623B5CE97BC@dukhovni.org>
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Openpgp: id=A3D192CE44EF412517BCED646A739B025C6B98D4
Message-ID: <8f68cfb0-2d6b-d86f-4ff0-a9282aa0bf55@samba.org>
Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2017 00:29:27 +0200
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.2.1
MIME-Version: 1.0
In-Reply-To: <F363B51E-FDF7-4C91-9ABD-B623B5CE97BC@dukhovni.org>
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg="pgp-sha1"; protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="KSAgShrCFKmj0fAhFUaQ83kUfX1xbwA1b"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/kitten/xBrXUFTPaXNOh6WigZ0hACRJJNc>
Subject: Re: [kitten] Checking the transited list of a kerberos ticket in a transitive cross-realm trust situation...
X-BeenThere: kitten@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: Common Authentication Technologies - Next Generation <kitten.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/kitten>, <mailto:kitten-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/kitten/>
List-Post: <mailto:kitten@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:kitten-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/kitten>, <mailto:kitten-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2017 22:29:41 -0000

Am 24.08.2017 um 22:47 schrieb Viktor Dukhovni:
> 
> [ Just kitten, as either not subcribed or subscribed with a different
>   address to some of the other lists. ]
> 
>> On Aug 24, 2017, at 1:36 PM, Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>>> We should enforce a PAC always to be present, as we don't support
>>> trusted domains with LSA_TRUST_TYPE_MIT anyway.
>>
>> In samba, yes, but that option can be used in other clients that can
>> connect to multiple types of servers so in case they do not get a PAC
>> the flag should be respected.
> 
> Does the Kerberos library know whether whether the application is going
> to look at PACs and SIDs or just use the client principal name?  I am
> guessing it does not.  Thus in Samba, one might need a dedicated
> krb5.conf configuration file that disables the transit check.  Other
> applications should still apply transit check even if a PAC happens
> to be present, as AFAIK it may well remain unused.

My idea was that Samba would use
gss_set_cred_option(GSS_KRB5_CRED_NO_TRANSIT_CHECK_X) to indicate
the the transited list should not be checked.

metze

v2.23.0 | Report a Bug | By Email