Re: review of draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-00

Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu> Wed, 26 May 2010 18:27 UTC

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From: Sam Hartman <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>
To: Scott Cantor <cantor.2@osu.edu>
Subject: Re: review of draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml-00
References: <tslzkzn67n5.fsf@mit.edu> <077001cafc4b$603f0510$20bd0f30$@osu.edu> <4BFD2ECE.5020600@cisco.com> <07e801cafce5$4cf7f7b0$e6e7e710$@osu.edu>
Date: Wed, 26 May 2010 14:26:30 -0400
In-Reply-To: <07e801cafce5$4cf7f7b0$e6e7e710$@osu.edu> (Scott Cantor's message of "Wed, 26 May 2010 11:08:29 -0400")
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Cc: kitten@ietf.org, moonshot-community@jiscmail.ac.uk, 'Sam Hartman' <hartmans-ietf@mit.edu>, draft-wierenga-ietf-sasl-saml@tools.ietf.org
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>>>>> "Scott" == Scott Cantor <cantor.2@osu.edu> writes:

    >> I am assuming you refer to the ECP profile. How different would
    >> this be from the SASL point of view? I.e. what difference would
    >> it make on the "SASL wire"?

    Scott> It suffers the same MITM issues that Sam mentioned, since
    Scott> that's what happens if you punt that to TLS without any
    Scott> channel bindings. I'm not in a position to address that
    Scott> without help, I just believe there's a better non-web flow
    Scott> here. It also creates a much more flexible field for phishing
    Scott> to be addressed, since the client/IdP exchange is not a
    Scott> browser and a web site.

Scott, I'm happy to work with you to figure out if channel binding
support is possible in your approach.