[Last-Call] draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review

Shivan Sahib via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> Tue, 06 January 2026 07:04 UTC

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Subject: [Last-Call] draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review
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Document: draft-ietf-emailcore-as
Title: Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols
Reviewer: Shivan Sahib
Review result: Has Issues

SECDIR last call review of draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26
"Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols"

Reviewer: Shivan Kaul Sahib (SECDIR)
Review result: Has Issues.

---

This Applicability Statement is generally accurate and, importantly for SECDIR,
it does not introduce new protocol mechanisms. Security/privacy considerations
are discussed throughout, with the material concentrated in Section 6
(confidentiality/authentication for SMTP) and the Received-header privacy
guidance in Section 3.2.1. The Security Considerations section is short but
summarizes the security-critical concerns.

Section 6 is mostly okay. It correctly frames hop-by-hop TLS, downgrade attacks
with STARTTLS, and the role + limits of RequireTLS/MTA-STS/DANE, as well as
message-level mechanisms.

---

Minor: In Section 3.2.1, the draft says: "Email addresses are commonly
classified as Personally Identifiable Information (PII)".

I suggest using IETF-standard privacy terminology and deferring to RFC 6973,
replacing "PII" (a US-centric privacy term) with "Personal Data" (as defined in
RFC 6973, also used in GDPR), or simply "personal data". RFC 6973 defines
Personal Data as "Any information relating to an individual who can be
identified, directly or indirectly."

---

Nit: s/Javascript/JavaScript in Section 4.3.

---

Nit: Section 6.1.2 says opportunistic TLS falls back "if a secure connection
cannot be established." Consider changing "secure" to "TLS-protected" (or
similar).

---

Minor: Section 6.1.2 asserts "the vast majority of email traffic is encrypted
during its time transiting". This seems like it needs a citation.

---

Section 6.3 describes SMTP AUTH and notes the common username/password
configuration for submission. It would be worth adding a sentence making the
security property explicit (e.g., credentials MUST NOT be sent without TLS, and
deployments should require TLS for AUTH).

---

Section 6.5 says "confidentiality... MUST be implemented", and then says
servers "servers MUST be configurable to allow for receiving messages without
confidentiality" for interop. This is a bit confusing.

---

When discussing STARTTLS, the draft doesn't mention anything about minimum TLS
version to use. Should there be a reference to/dependence on RFC 8997 (or
perhaps RFC 9325) here?

---

Thanks,
Shivan