[Last-Call] Re: draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review
Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Mon, 12 January 2026 17:58 UTC
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Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:57:58 +0000
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To: Shivan Sahib <shivankaulsahib@gmail.com>, secdir@ietf.org
References: <176768306377.3505627.2383646331815548475@dt-datatracker-5656579b89-p6k4r>
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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CC: draft-ietf-emailcore-as.all@ietf.org, emailcore@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org
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Subject: [Last-Call] Re: draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review
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Hi Shivan, Thank you for your review. On 06/01/2026 07:04, Shivan Sahib via Datatracker wrote: > Document: draft-ietf-emailcore-as > Title: Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols > Reviewer: Shivan Sahib > Review result: Has Issues > > SECDIR last call review of draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 > "Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols" > > Reviewer: Shivan Kaul Sahib (SECDIR) > Review result: Has Issues. > > --- > > This Applicability Statement is generally accurate and, importantly for SECDIR, > it does not introduce new protocol mechanisms. Security/privacy considerations > are discussed throughout, with the material concentrated in Section 6 > (confidentiality/authentication for SMTP) and the Received-header privacy > guidance in Section 3.2.1. The Security Considerations section is short but > summarizes the security-critical concerns. > > Section 6 is mostly okay. It correctly frames hop-by-hop TLS, downgrade attacks > with STARTTLS, and the role + limits of RequireTLS/MTA-STS/DANE, as well as > message-level mechanisms. > > --- > > Minor: In Section 3.2.1, the draft says: "Email addresses are commonly > classified as Personally Identifiable Information (PII)". > > I suggest using IETF-standard privacy terminology and deferring to RFC 6973, > replacing "PII" (a US-centric privacy term) with "Personal Data" (as defined in > RFC 6973, also used in GDPR), or simply "personal data". RFC 6973 defines > Personal Data as "Any information relating to an individual who can be > identified, directly or indirectly." > > --- > > Nit: s/Javascript/JavaScript in Section 4.3. > > --- > > Nit: Section 6.1.2 says opportunistic TLS falls back "if a secure connection > cannot be established." Consider changing "secure" to "TLS-protected" (or > similar). Most of the above are applied to draft copy. > --- > > Minor: Section 6.1.2 asserts "the vast majority of email traffic is encrypted > during its time transiting". This seems like it needs a citation. Any citation is not going to be suitable as permanent reference from an RFC. One example is Gmail transparency report: https://transparencyreport.google.com/safer-email/overview > --- > > Section 6.3 describes SMTP AUTH and notes the common username/password > configuration for submission. It would be worth adding a sentence making the > security property explicit (e.g., credentials MUST NOT be sent without TLS, and > deployments should require TLS for AUTH). We are wordsmithing your suggestion to make the statement about specific SASL mechanisms (as used by SMTP AUTH) more precise. > --- > > Section 6.5 says "confidentiality... MUST be implemented", and then says > servers "servers MUST be configurable to allow for receiving messages without > confidentiality" for interop. This is a bit confusing. This is the subject of big discussion on the Last Call mailing list. We will adjust the text as per that discussion. > --- > > When discussing STARTTLS, the draft doesn't mention anything about minimum TLS > version to use. Should there be a reference to/dependence on RFC 8997 (or > perhaps RFC 9325) here? Strictly speaking RFC 8997 is about Message Submission, so doesn't apply to MTA-to-MTA links. But making general recommendations about use of TLS versions >= 1.2 probably makes sense. Best Regards, Alexey
- [Last-Call] draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last … Shivan Sahib via Datatracker
- [Last-Call] Re: draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf l… Alexey Melnikov
- [Last-Call] Re: [Emailcore] draft-ietf-emailcore-… Ken Murchison