[Last-Call] Re: draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review

Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com> Mon, 12 January 2026 17:58 UTC

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Date: Mon, 12 Jan 2026 17:57:58 +0000
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To: Shivan Sahib <shivankaulsahib@gmail.com>, secdir@ietf.org
References: <176768306377.3505627.2383646331815548475@dt-datatracker-5656579b89-p6k4r>
From: Alexey Melnikov <alexey.melnikov@isode.com>
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Subject: [Last-Call] Re: draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26 ietf last call Secdir review
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Hi Shivan,

Thank you for your review.

On 06/01/2026 07:04, Shivan Sahib via Datatracker wrote:
> Document: draft-ietf-emailcore-as
> Title: Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols
> Reviewer: Shivan Sahib
> Review result: Has Issues
>
> SECDIR last call review of draft-ietf-emailcore-as-26
> "Applicability Statement for IETF Core Email Protocols"
>
> Reviewer: Shivan Kaul Sahib (SECDIR)
> Review result: Has Issues.
>
> ---
>
> This Applicability Statement is generally accurate and, importantly for SECDIR,
> it does not introduce new protocol mechanisms. Security/privacy considerations
> are discussed throughout, with the material concentrated in Section 6
> (confidentiality/authentication for SMTP) and the Received-header privacy
> guidance in Section 3.2.1. The Security Considerations section is short but
> summarizes the security-critical concerns.
>
> Section 6 is mostly okay. It correctly frames hop-by-hop TLS, downgrade attacks
> with STARTTLS, and the role + limits of RequireTLS/MTA-STS/DANE, as well as
> message-level mechanisms.
>
> ---
>
> Minor: In Section 3.2.1, the draft says: "Email addresses are commonly
> classified as Personally Identifiable Information (PII)".
>
> I suggest using IETF-standard privacy terminology and deferring to RFC 6973,
> replacing "PII" (a US-centric privacy term) with "Personal Data" (as defined in
> RFC 6973, also used in GDPR), or simply "personal data". RFC 6973 defines
> Personal Data as "Any information relating to an individual who can be
> identified, directly or indirectly."
>
> ---
>
> Nit: s/Javascript/JavaScript in Section 4.3.
>
> ---
>
> Nit: Section 6.1.2 says opportunistic TLS falls back "if a secure connection
> cannot be established." Consider changing "secure" to "TLS-protected" (or
> similar).
Most of the above are applied to draft copy.
> ---
>
> Minor: Section 6.1.2 asserts "the vast majority of email traffic is encrypted
> during its time transiting". This seems like it needs a citation.
Any citation is not going to be suitable as permanent reference from an 
RFC. One example is Gmail transparency report: 
https://transparencyreport.google.com/safer-email/overview
> ---
>
> Section 6.3 describes SMTP AUTH and notes the common username/password
> configuration for submission. It would be worth adding a sentence making the
> security property explicit (e.g., credentials MUST NOT be sent without TLS, and
> deployments should require TLS for AUTH).
We are wordsmithing your suggestion to make the statement about specific 
SASL mechanisms (as used by SMTP AUTH) more precise.
> ---
>
> Section 6.5 says "confidentiality... MUST be implemented", and then says
> servers "servers MUST be configurable to allow for receiving messages without
> confidentiality" for interop. This is a bit confusing.
This is the subject of big discussion on the Last Call mailing list. We 
will adjust the text as per that discussion.
> ---
>
> When discussing STARTTLS, the draft doesn't mention anything about minimum TLS
> version to use. Should there be a reference to/dependence on RFC 8997 (or
> perhaps RFC 9325) here?

Strictly speaking RFC 8997 is about Message Submission, so doesn't apply 
to MTA-to-MTA links. But making general recommendations about use of TLS 
versions >= 1.2 probably makes sense.


Best Regards,

Alexey