[lisp] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-lisp-rfc6830bis-32: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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** Section 1.1. The applicability statement of “large set of cooperating
entities seeking to communicate over the public Internet or other large
underlay IP infrastructures” seems inconsistent with many of the protocol
mechanics described.  Specifically, most of the capabilities in the LISP header
(Locator-Status-Bits, Echo-nonce mechanism, Map-Versioning, Instance ID) and
the “Gleaning mechanism” are explicitly noted as not being suitable for
Internet use.  This section needs to be explicit that only a subset of the
protocol is suitable for the Internet.  Likewise, it should be clearer about
what is assumed elements of the closed network are trusted for what particular
behaviors.

** Section 16. Per “Locator-Status-Bits, echo-nonce and map-versioning SHOULD
NOT be used over the public Internet and SHOULD only be used in trusted and
closed deployments” -- not disagreement.  However, under what circumstances
would they be used on the internet to warrant a SHOULD NOT instead of a
stronger MUST NOT?

** Section 8.  Per “Participants within a LISP deployment must agree on the
meaning of Instance ID values.  The source and destination EIDs MUST belong to
the same Instance ID.”  Could parties agree that the Instance ID is 802.1Q tags
and send those across the internet?  Recommend stronger cautionary language on
using Instance ID.


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COMMENT:
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Thank you for being responsive to the prior security feedback from the SECDIR
(and thanks to Kyle Rose for performing it) and Security ADs in the return of
this document to the telechat.

I support Martin Duke’s DISCUSS position and endorse the creation of a
dedicated section covering which protocol features should not be used on the
internet.

**  Section 4.0.  Per “… this document recommends that a maximum of two LISP
headers …”, should a normative RECOMMENDED be used here instead?

** Section 5.3. Per “However, the same nonce can be used for a period of time
when encapsulating to the same ETR.”, should this be bounded, even
qualitatively?

** Section 9.
      A
      "gleaned" Map-Cache entry is only stored and used for a few
      seconds, pending verification.  Verification is performed by
      sending a Map-Request to the source EID (the inner-header IP
      source address) of the received encapsulated packet.

-- Is there any more precision that could be provided about the cache lifetime
beyond “a few seconds”

-- Should normative language be provided that this cache should be aged and
verification performed?

** Editorial Nit
-- Section 13.2. Typo s/synzhronization/ synchronization/