Re: [Lsr] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Acee Lindem <acee.ietf@gmail.com> Sat, 03 February 2024 19:16 UTC

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From: Acee Lindem <acee.ietf@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <88993C85-C0E6-4DAA-90F6-8145FB83B27C@juniper.net>
Date: Sat, 03 Feb 2024 14:15:53 -0500
Cc: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang@ietf.org>, lsr-chairs <lsr-chairs@ietf.org>, lsr <lsr@ietf.org>, Christian Hopps <chopps@chopps.org>
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To: John Scudder <jgs@juniper.net>
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Subject: Re: [Lsr] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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Hi John, Roman, 

I’ve updated the text in -29 to clarify how modifying the enabling and disabling OSPFv3 Extended LSA support could prevent the correct routes from being installed (i.e., a denial of service attack). I really don’t see how this could be used to misroute traffic (as suggested by Roman) unless the alternate routes already installed (e.g., a default route) that would misroute the traffic. So, this would be, at best, a non-deterministic attack. 

Thanks,
Acee

> On Feb 1, 2024, at 11:55 AM, John Scudder <jgs@juniper.net> wrote:
> 
> Hi Acee, Roman, all,
> 
> [top posting, hope that’s OK]
> 
> After talking with Roman about this today, what I understand his position to be is (at least in part), since the document identifies one specific case of a type of attack ("The ability to disable OSPFv3 Extended LSA support can result in a denial of service”), shouldn’t it also list other cases? What’s special about "denial of service” vs. other things such as the ones Roman mentioned? I don’t think he was seeking an in-depth exploration of these, just a more complete summary list. I also wonder if the concern could equally be satisfied by removing the one special case.
> 
> I’m sure Roman will chime in if I’ve gotten this wrong.
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> —John
> 
>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 8:50 PM, Acee Lindem <acee.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 20:14, Acee Lindem <acee.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 19:56, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <noreply@ietf.org> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
>>>> draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang-28: Discuss
>>>> 
>>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ 
>>>> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang/
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> DISCUSS:
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> 
>>>> ** Section 5.
>>>> 
>>>> Write
>>>> operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper
>>>> protection can have a negative effect on network operations.  There
>>>> are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
>>>> 
>>>>    /ospf:ospf/extended-lsa-support
>>>>    /ospf:ospf/ospf:areas/ospf:area/extended-lsa-support
>>>>    The ability to disable OSPFv3 Extended LSA support can result in a
>>>>    denial of service.
>>>> 
>>>> Isn’t it more than just denial of service?  In certain environments wouldn’t
>>>> the ability to modify OSPF Extended LSA configurations enable an attacker to:
>>>> modify network topologies to enable select traffic to avoid inspection or
>>>> treatment by security controls; route traffic in a way that it would be subject
>>>> to inspect/modification by an adversary node; or gain access to otherwise
>>>> segregated parts of the network.
>>> 
>>> Only if they were able to craft extended LSAs on behalf of the original as well as
>>> modify the YANG configuration added by this document. I didn’t think we’d have to
>>> reiterate all the possible protocol attacks for every incremental enhancement.
>> 
>> Furthermore, no one is going to use the support of extended LSAs to isolate OSPFv3 domains 
>> from one another. The configuration is to control migration to the extended LSA encodings.
>> Please see RFC 8362 for more information on OSPFv3 Extended LSAs.  
>> 
>> Acee
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> Acee
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> COMMENT:
>>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>> 
>>>> As an editorial note, I would have benefit from some narrative prose on the data model.
>> 
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