Re: [Lsr] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang-28: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[John Scudder <[e-mail]>]

Hi Acee, Roman, all,

[top posting, hope that’s OK]

After talking with Roman about this today, what I understand his position to be is (at least in part), since the document identifies one specific case of a type of attack ("The ability to disable OSPFv3 Extended LSA support can result in a denial of service”), shouldn’t it also list other cases? What’s special about "denial of service” vs. other things such as the ones Roman mentioned? I don’t think he was seeking an in-depth exploration of these, just a more complete summary list. I also wonder if the concern could equally be satisfied by removing the one special case.

I’m sure Roman will chime in if I’ve gotten this wrong.

Thanks,

—John

> On Jan 31, 2024, at 8:50 PM, Acee Lindem <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 20:14, Acee Lindem <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> On Jan 31, 2024, at 19:56, Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
>>> draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang-28: Discuss
>>> 
>>> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
>>> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
>>> introductory paragraph, however.)
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/about/groups/iesg/statements/handling-ballot-positions/ 
>>> for more information about how to handle DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
>>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lsr-ospfv3-extended-lsa-yang/
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> DISCUSS:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> ** Section 5.
>>> 
>>>  Write
>>>  operations (e.g., edit-config) to these data nodes without proper
>>>  protection can have a negative effect on network operations.  There
>>>  are the subtrees and data nodes and their sensitivity/vulnerability:
>>> 
>>>     /ospf:ospf/extended-lsa-support
>>>     /ospf:ospf/ospf:areas/ospf:area/extended-lsa-support
>>>     The ability to disable OSPFv3 Extended LSA support can result in a
>>>     denial of service.
>>> 
>>> Isn’t it more than just denial of service?  In certain environments wouldn’t
>>> the ability to modify OSPF Extended LSA configurations enable an attacker to:
>>> modify network topologies to enable select traffic to avoid inspection or
>>> treatment by security controls; route traffic in a way that it would be subject
>>> to inspect/modification by an adversary node; or gain access to otherwise
>>> segregated parts of the network.
>> 
>> Only if they were able to craft extended LSAs on behalf of the original as well as
>> modify the YANG configuration added by this document. I didn’t think we’d have to
>> reiterate all the possible protocol attacks for every incremental enhancement.
> 
> Furthermore, no one is going to use the support of extended LSAs to isolate OSPFv3 domains 
> from one another. The configuration is to control migration to the extended LSA encodings.
> Please see RFC 8362 for more information on OSPFv3 Extended LSAs.  
> 
> Acee
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> Acee
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> COMMENT:
>>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> 
>>> As an editorial note, I would have benefit from some narrative prose on the data model.
> 
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