Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what?

Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> Tue, 04 September 2018 18:17 UTC

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Date: Tue, 04 Sep 2018 11:17:00 -0700
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From: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
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Subject: Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what?
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>>> 'datacenter operators' == "hyperscale web wonkers" ?
>> i asked in lsvr, which is what i guess you woud call hyperscale.
>> lsvr also tends toward decentralized,
> sorry: 'decentralized' means what here?

for example, compare jupiter rising to bgp-spf; both of which i think
are super cool

>>> or 'datacenter operators' == 'colo provider' ('the planet' not
>>> 'equinix' and 'the planet' is now 'someone else' but...)
>> 1x would seem especially inapporpriate here as there is no
>> centralisation of authority.
> So, in a large datacenter where randos are able to walk around and
> affect change to my cage's in/outs (and potentially clamp mitm/etc
> gear without my knowledge) there's a different 'security concern' than
> there is in a building I wholey own and operate behind several layers
> of physical security and such.

there are probably threats shared between the two, oh frabjious joy.
but i suspect the intersection is far smaller than the union.

> If all of your "datacenter deployment" is inside a single cage in a
> colocation building you MAY be "safe", but if you span cage spaces
> (who ever decided on day-one in a building that they only would ever
> need 640kb ram/squarefeet/kw/etc?) you are potentially sending your
> 'routing protocols' over links outside of your immediate security
> perimeter.

yes, in which case one worries about those monkeys in the middle more
than ever

> That seems rather scary... like kinda really scary, actually...  I
> wonder how often people consider: "security of the data in the
> datacenter (at rest or in flight)" but forget about the routing system
> which is intrinsic to the operation of that datacenter?

we would be out of work were it not for the naïve :)

>>>>> Is recommending 802.1x possible/sufficient (given the description in
>>>>> Randy's strawperson comment)?
>>>> it's a long way to that radius server
>> with coffee, i might expand a bit.  during turn up of new links and
>> devices, it may not be easy to get to a distant 1x authority.
> I'd point out that if you put business critical dependencies 'far
> away' you are a competitor I'd love to have? :)
> Ideally once you figure out your deployment scenario and drive down
> all the dependency tree branches you figure out who/what needs to be
> "local" to the deployment, and how to live in a state where that
> dependency is unfulfilled for part of the turnup/repair/turndown
> workflows.  Right?

sure.  but at the moment, i am trying to tease out the lsvr ops' threat
models.

randy