Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what?
Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Wed, 05 September 2018 05:16 UTC
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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 05 Sep 2018 01:16:18 -0400
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To: Randy Bush <randy@psg.com>
Cc: Erik Kline <ek@google.com>, opsec wg mailing list <opsec@ietf.org>, lsvr@ietf.org, gunter.van_de_velde@nokia.com
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Subject: Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what?
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On Tue, Sep 4, 2018 at 2:17 PM Randy Bush <randy@psg.com> wrote: > >>> 'datacenter operators' == "hyperscale web wonkers" ? > >> i asked in lsvr, which is what i guess you woud call hyperscale. > >> lsvr also tends toward decentralized, > > sorry: 'decentralized' means what here? > > for example, compare jupiter rising to bgp-spf; both of which i think > are super cool > > oh! decentralized routing decision vs > >>> or 'datacenter operators' == 'colo provider' ('the planet' not > >>> 'equinix' and 'the planet' is now 'someone else' but...) > >> 1x would seem especially inapporpriate here as there is no > >> centralisation of authority. > > So, in a large datacenter where randos are able to walk around and > > affect change to my cage's in/outs (and potentially clamp mitm/etc > > gear without my knowledge) there's a different 'security concern' than > > there is in a building I wholey own and operate behind several layers > > of physical security and such. > > there are probably threats shared between the two, oh frabjious joy. > but i suspect the intersection is far smaller than the union. > > ok. > > If all of your "datacenter deployment" is inside a single cage in a > > colocation building you MAY be "safe", but if you span cage spaces > > (who ever decided on day-one in a building that they only would ever > > need 640kb ram/squarefeet/kw/etc?) you are potentially sending your > > 'routing protocols' over links outside of your immediate security > > perimeter. > > yes, in which case one worries about those monkeys in the middle more > than ever > > yup. > > That seems rather scary... like kinda really scary, actually... I > > wonder how often people consider: "security of the data in the > > datacenter (at rest or in flight)" but forget about the routing system > > which is intrinsic to the operation of that datacenter? > > we would be out of work were it not for the naïve :) > > it's not really just 'naive' as much as shifting sands of requirements and sudden successes :) > >>>>> Is recommending 802.1x possible/sufficient (given the description in > >>>>> Randy's strawperson comment)? > >>>> it's a long way to that radius server > >> with coffee, i might expand a bit. during turn up of new links and > >> devices, it may not be easy to get to a distant 1x authority. > > I'd point out that if you put business critical dependencies 'far > > away' you are a competitor I'd love to have? :) > > Ideally once you figure out your deployment scenario and drive down > > all the dependency tree branches you figure out who/what needs to be > > "local" to the deployment, and how to live in a state where that > > dependency is unfulfilled for part of the turnup/repair/turndown > > workflows. Right? > > sure. but at the moment, i am trying to tease out the lsvr ops' threat > models. > > ok, i'll be quiet now and see what other people think are problematic :) > randy >
- [Lsvr] security against what? Randy Bush
- Re: [Lsvr] security against what? Van De Velde, Gunter (Nokia - BE/Antwerp)
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Erik Kline
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Randy Bush
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [Lsvr] security against what? Tony Przygienda
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Randy Bush
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Christopher Morrow
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Randy Bush
- Re: [Lsvr] [OPSEC] security against what? Christopher Morrow