Re: [Mip6] WG LC (Deadline Dec 18th, 04) for I-Ds: draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-01.txt anddraft-ietf-mip6-mn-ident-option-00.txt

I'd suggest that someone write a draft for the radext WG proposing MD5 be
replaced with SHA-1.

I doubt that the security directorate will let draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol
progress, even as Informational, if MD5 is in it.

        jak

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Wing Cheong Lau" <lau@qualcomm.com>
To: "Kent Leung" <kleung@cisco.com>; "James Kempf"
<kempf@docomolabs-usa.com>
Cc: <mip6@ietf.org>; "Francis Dupont" <Francis.Dupont@enst-bretagne.fr>;
<Basavaraj.Patil@nokia.com>
Sent: Thursday, December 16, 2004 2:33 PM
Subject: Re: [Mip6] WG LC (Deadline Dec 18th, 04) for I-Ds:
draft-ietf-mip6-auth-protocol-01.txt
anddraft-ietf-mip6-mn-ident-option-00.txt

> At 01:34 PM 12/16/2004, Kent Leung wrote:
> >Hi James.
> >
> >Acknowledged.  Unless there's disagreement, we'll replace MD5 context
> >with SHA-1 in the document.
> >
> >Thanks.
> >
> >Kent
> Dear Kent,
>
> Once you replace MD5 with SHA-1, will you be proposing corresponding
> extensions/ changes to
> RADIUS and CHAP so that one can use RADIUS/CHAP to authenticate a BU using
> MN-AAA authentication
> option in your draft ? (there is no mentioning of SHA-1 in RFC2865 or RFC
> 1996 so far).
>
> If not, how will the MN-AAA option interoperate with the AAA ?
>
> Regards,
>
> Wing
>
> >At 05:41 PM 12/14/2004 -0800, James Kempf wrote:
> >> >  - another point: MD5 should be replaced by SHA-1 everywhere in the
> >>document.
> >>
> >>Yes, this can't be emphasized strongly enough.
> >>
> >>Results by Xiaoyun Wang from China presented at Crypto in Santa Barbara
this
> >>summer showed that with 1 hr of precomputation on IBM P690, new
collisons on
> >>1024 bit messages could be generated every 15 sec. to 5 min. MD5 should
be
> >>considered insecure and not used, and it should be EOL-ed in existing
IETF
> >>protocols and replaced with SHA-1.
> >>
> >>SHA-1 appears to be secure after 40 rounds but has been broken up to 40
(it
> >>typically takes 80), which appears to be the limit possible with the
current
> >>cryptanalysis technique. Whether its possible to break SHA-1 completely,
> >>remains to be seen.
> >>
> >>                     jak
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>_______________________________________________
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> >>Mip6@ietf.org
> >>https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mip6
> >
> >--
> >      |           |                   Kent Leung
> >     :|:         :|:                  IP Mobility Development
> >    :|||:       :|||:                 IOS Technologies Division
> >   :|||||||:   :|||||||:              Voice: 408.526.5030
> >.:|||||||||:.:|||||||||:.             Fax:   408.525.1653
> >  c i s c o S y s t e m s             Email: kleung@cisco.com
> >
> >_______________________________________________
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> >Mip6@ietf.org
> >https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mip6
>
>

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