[MMUSIC] Alissa Cooper's No Objection on draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-12: (with COMMENT)

["Alissa Cooper" <[e-mail]>]

Alissa Cooper has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-12: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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Section 5.1 says:

"An endpoint MAY, in addition to its more preferred hash function,
   also verify that each certificate used matches fingerprints
   calculated using other hash functions.  Unless there is a matching
   fingerprint for each tested hash function, the endpoint MUST NOT
   establish the TLS connection."

This seems a little weird to me. It's up to the endpoint to decide
whether to check for errors, and then if it does find an error it can't
setup the connection, whereas if it just hadn't checked it would be able
to setup the connection. I think it would help to explain why an endpoint
would be motivated to check multiple fingerprints.