Re: [MMUSIC] 4572 update: forbid weak hashes?

Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com> Mon, 25 April 2016 19:26 UTC

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From: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
To: Roman Shpount <roman@telurix.com>
Thread-Topic: [MMUSIC] 4572 update: forbid weak hashes?
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Date: Mon, 25 Apr 2016 19:26:10 +0000
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Cc: "mmusic@ietf.org" <mmusic@ietf.org>, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [MMUSIC] 4572 update: forbid weak hashes?
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So, does anyone object to the proposal: no matter how many certificates (and associated fingerprints) the SDP contains, as long as there is *one* hash (that the receiver supports and consider secure enough) matches the certificate, things are good.

(I agree that is also the best (only?) solution from a backward compatibility perspective)

Regards,

Christer

From: Roman Shpount [mailto:roman@telurix.com]
Sent: 25 April 2016 22:19
To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>
Cc: Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>; mmusic@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [MMUSIC] 4572 update: forbid weak hashes?

On Mon, Apr 25, 2016 at 2:37 PM, Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com<mailto:christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>> wrote:
>There is no indication what fingerprint applies to what certificate in SDP fingerprint attribute. >The rule should be if connection is established a certificate which matches at least one hash >that you consider secure, the connection should be accepted. If you would make it more >complicated, this will likely break backwards interop or would require changes to >fingerprint/DTLS/certificates.

I don’t want to make things complicated – I want to agree on something, update the draft based on that, and go WGLC :)


I agree with trying to keep things simple. This means agreeing to something that is secure enough (one match for anything you consider secure is enough) vs trying to create something that is more secure (one fingerprint for each offered fingerprint hash algorithm must match).

Regards,
_____________
Roman Shpount