Re: [MMUSIC] Review of draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-bundle-negotiation-32 - Magnus' comments - MID security

Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com> Thu, 06 October 2016 13:39 UTC

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To: Christer Holmberg <christer.holmberg@ericsson.com>, Paul Kyzivat <pkyzivat@alum.mit.edu>, "mmusic@ietf.org" <mmusic@ietf.org>
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From: Magnus Westerlund <magnus.westerlund@ericsson.com>
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Date: Thu, 06 Oct 2016 15:39:05 +0200
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Subject: Re: [MMUSIC] Review of draft-ietf-mmusic-sdp-bundle-negotiation-32 - Magnus' comments - MID security
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Den 2016-10-06 kl. 14:49, skrev Christer Holmberg:
>
> Hi,
>
> Magnus suggested usage of RFC 6904 for encryption of the RTP SDES header
> extension for MID. I guess it would be a SHUOLD?
>
> In addition, we would say that a corresponding level of security must be
> applied to the RTP SDES header extension for MID and to the RTCP SDES MID
> item.
>
> Any opinions?

I think this is fine solution to this issue. I would probably formulate 
the security considerations like this.

The identfication-tag when included in the RTP MID SDES item, 
independent of transport, RTCP SDES packet or RTP header extension, can 
expose the value to parties beyond the signaling chain. Therefore, the 
identification-tag MUST NOT contain any user related information. 
However, the implementation's method for generating identfication-tags 
combined with hardware configuration can enable fingerprinting of the 
endpoint device and thus its user. As the identification-tag is also 
used to route the media stream to the right application functionality it 
is also important that the value received is the one intended by the 
sender, thus integrity and the authenticity of the source are important 
to prevent denial of service on the application. At least to prevent 
third parties from modifying the identification-tag value.

Due to the security risks associated with the MID values in RTP and RTCP 
it is strongly RECOMMENDED that the MID SDES item is both 
confidentiality protected as well as source authenticated when 
transported in either RTCP or RTP header extensions. The security 
mechanisms used SHALL provide corresponding levels of security for both 
RTP header extensions and RTCP. Confidentiality mechanisms for RTP/RTCP 
are discussed in Options for Securing RTP Sessions [RFC7201], for 
example SRTP [RFC3711] with SRTCP encryption enabled combined with 
[RFC6904] can provide the necessary security functions.


Cheers

Magnus Westerlund

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