Re: [Model-t] [EXT] Re: Review of draft-thomson-tmi

Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com> Wed, 08 December 2021 13:20 UTC

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Date: Wed, 08 Dec 2021 14:20:31 +0100
From: Vittorio Bertola <vittorio.bertola@open-xchange.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [Model-t] [EXT] Re: Review of draft-thomson-tmi
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> Il 08/12/2021 14:05 Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> ha scritto:
> 
> I don't understand how the Internet Engineering Task Force can
> meaningfully address endpoint security. Nor have I seen an example of
> how 3552 updates would meaningfully address this, or changes in
> protocols that would help either. If the product you want is Ware
> report 2.0, that's potentially valuable, but not I think what we need
> for the I part of the IETF.

No, device security is out of scope, but the choice of protocol architectures is directly influenced by whether you want to consider potential "endpoint intermediary" misbehaviour or not, which in turn will influence your take on whether hooks for other intermediaries in the conversation (in the network, as side services, however you want) are desirable or not. Yesterday someone was pointing out the work that the W3C is doing ( https://github.com/w3ctag/privacy-principles ), I still need to go through it but at first sight it looks like an interesting approach.

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Vittorio Bertola | Head of Policy & Innovation, Open-Xchange
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