Re: [mpls] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-mpls-sfc-encapsulation-03: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

["Adrian Farrel" <[e-mail]>]

Andy,

 

Go ahead and copy text from draft-ietf-mpls-sfc, if you want to. I wrote it and I donate each and every word to you for no fee. You can even use them in the same order if it suits you.

 

Acknowledgements are also nice.

 

Adrian

 

From: mpls <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Andrew G. Malis
Sent: 15 March 2019 15:06
To: Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]>
Cc: mpls-chairs <[e-mail]>; mpls <[e-mail]>; The IESG <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [mpls] Benjamin Kaduk's Discuss on draft-ietf-mpls-sfc-encapsulation-03: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

 

Benjamin,

 

Thanks for your review and comments. See below inline..

 

On Wed, Mar 13, 2019 at 10:13 PM Benjamin Kaduk via Datatracker <[e-mail] <mailto:[e-mail]> > wrote:


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DISCUSS:
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Thanks for this clear and concise document!  I just have one concern,
which will hopefully be easy to resolve (since there is a good chance
that all the text necessary to do so is already written).

As far as I can tell, the comment made by the secdir reviewer of
draft-ietf-mpls-sfc-04 about circular references between that document
and RFCs 7665 and 8300 regarding security properties, is also somewhat
applicable to this document.  I do recognize the validity of first
paragraph of the security considerations here (the NSH is an opaque
payload for MPLS), but that in and of itself does not present a security
analysis of the NSH in the MPLS environment.  The last paragraph of the
security considerations of this document attempts to provide some
analysis, but it seems to be incomplete and perhaps overly optimistic,
particularly with respect to the use of MPLS with Inter-Carrier
Interconnect and the processing of MPLS traffic from external
interfaces.  Is there any reason not to fully harmonize (i.e.,
synchronize) the security considerations of draft-ietf-mpls-sfc and
draft-ietf-mpls-sfc-encapsulation?  (I guess the first paragraph of this
document's security considerations doesn't apply to the other document,
that allocates extended-special-purpose label values, but that's the
only thing I saw.)

 

Trying to keep this document in sync with draft-ietf-mpls-sfc was difficult because it was a moving target while this draft was being developed, and of course, it was updated during IETF last call and IESG review following the completion of this draft. And as you noted, there are some fundamental differences between the two drafts. Because the other draft makes some additions and changes to the MPLS label stack while this draft uses the MPLS label stack as designed and in wide practice, there's text in the other draft that doesn't apply to this one, such as regarding the use of MPLS to encode a logical representation of the NSH.

 

If you have any specific suggestions for improvement for the text here, that would be greatly appreciated! Also, does the IESG have any policy regarding direct copying of applicable text from one draft to another in situations like this? Or perhaps we could just add a reference to particular paragraphs in section 15 of draft-ietf-mpls-sfc? That would remove the need to copy any text.

 

I'll await your reply before taking any action.

 

 

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COMMENT:
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Section 1

   This encapsulation is equivalent from an SFC perspective to other
   transport encapsulations of packets using the NSH.  This can be
   illustrated by adding an additional line to the example of a next-hop
   SPI/SI-to-network overlay network locator mapping in Table 1 of
   [RFC8300]:

We probably should expand SPI and SI, since we haven't yet hit a
terminiology section or a note that (implies that) readers should be
familiar with the standard SFC terminology.
Also, Table 1 of RFC 8300 is labeled "SFF NSH Mapping Example"; it's not
really clear that specifically that table is the best way to illustrate
how the MPLS encapsulation would work.

 

 That table 1 extension was added to the draft as a result of the Routing Directorate review. Other than expanding the acronyms, I'll leave making any changes here up to Deborah.

 


(side note) We use the strings "VPN" and "virtual private" here, which
in some contexts will cause an (uninformed) reader to assume that data
privacy (confidentiality) is involved; our uses do not seem to be for
cases that would involve such a confidentiality property.  As a general
matter, not necessarily involving changes to this document, it may be
good to try to reserve these terms for cases where the confidentiality
is in fact provided, to help disambiguate the cases for the reader. 

 

I take your point, but these are just examples of other uses of MPLS service labels.

 

Section 2.1

nit: s/The TTL For/The TTL for/ (twice)

 

Will fix.

 


Section 3

   For SFC, ECMP may or may not be desirable.  To prevent ECMP when it
   is not desired, the NSH Base Header was carefully constructed so that
   the NSH could not look like IPv4 or IPv6 based on its first nibble.
   See Section 2.2 of [RFC8300] for further details.

nit: this paragraph might flow better into the next one if we add a note
that "Accordingly, the default behavior for MPLS-encapsulated SFC will
not use ECMP."

 

Good suggestion, will add.

 


Section 6

   However, it can be argued that carrying the NSH over MPLS is more

re: "it can be argued" -- is this document attempting to make that argument?

 

It could be argued that is the case! :-) 

 

   secure than using other encapsulations, as it is extremely difficult,
   due to the MPLS architecture, for an attempted attacker to inject

It's not entirely clear to me how much of this is the MPLS architecture
vs. implementation/deployment; I suppose to some extent it is true of
both.

 

IMHO, it really is a result of the architecture, and as a result, any implementation that properly follows the architecture. MPLS packets must be created by a PE router, and downstream P routers will drop any incoming MPLS packets from upstream P or PE routers that don't have a top-most label that's in the router's LIB. So successfully injecting MPLS attack packets really does require insider access, and if you have that, there are so many other bad things you can do that are less expensive or difficult than trying to use an MPLS-based attack.

 


   unexpected MPLS packets into a network, as MPLS networks do not by
   design accept MPLS packets from external interfaces, and an attacker

What about Inter-Carrier Interconnect?

 

MPLS ICI is really off-topic for this draft because the NSH is only used in limited SFC domains that not only within a single domain (see RFC 8300), but within a well-defined sub-domain of that provider, such as within a data center. 

 

That said, just to answer your question, carriers for the most part don't do MPLS across carrier boundaries, there's too much trust that would be required. That said, there are some examples of inter-carrier MPLS, most commonly using RFC 4364 option A, which really isn't an MPLS interface. There is an MPLS Forum document, https://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/ipmpls/IPMPLSForum19.0.0.pdf , which discusses the various ways one can implement an MPLS ICI and the security implications of doing so, in section 13.

 


   would need knowledge of the specific labels allocated by control and/
   or management plane protocols.  Thus, an attacker attempting to spoof
   MPLS-encapsulated NSH packets would require insider knowledge of the

An attacker in a position to inject traffic seems likely to also be able
to observe legitimate traffic and correspondingly their valid label
values (if not necessarily the mapping from label to behavior).

 

Absolutely, As I said above, if you've got that much insider access, there are much easier ways to screw up a network than play with MPLS packets.

 


   network's control and management planes and a way to inject packets
   into internal interfaces.  This is compared to, for example, NSH over
   UDP over IP, which could be injected into any external interface in a
   network that was not properly configured to filter out such packets
   at the ingress.

The NSH security considerations already (essentially) require this
filtering at ingress behavior; the practical question relevant here
seems to just be a matter of scale -- how hard it is to misconfigure
this filtering or how likely it is that the relevant filtering is
present as a consequence of factors external to SFC.

 

I think that's a question more for RFC 8300 than this draft. In terms of how hard it is to misconfigure filtering, that's really an implementation and deployment question.

 

Thanks again for your review.

 

Cheers,

Andy