Re: [netconf] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-29
Reese Enghardt <ietf@tenghardt.net> Mon, 29 January 2024 21:05 UTC
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To: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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From: Reese Enghardt <ietf@tenghardt.net>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-netconf-keystore-29
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Hi Kent, Thank you for the responses. Please see inline: On 1/26/24 17:47, Kent Watsen wrote: > On Jan 22, 2024, at 8:36 PM, Reese Enghardt via Datatracker > <noreply@ietf.org> wrote: >> >> […] >> I was surprised to see that the model allows to store keys in the >> clear. I >> assume that the WG has carefully considered the security implications >> here, and >> at least Section 4.2 says a key SHOULD be encrypted. Still, I wonder, >> if it's >> worth giving a bit of context in the Introduction, maybe saying why >> clear text >> keys are supported but that they SHOULD NOT be used unless there's no >> other way? > > Whoops, my Security Considerations for the module left out this paragraph > added to all of the other drafts in the series: > > Please be aware that this YANG module uses groupings from > other YANG modules that define nodes that may be considered > sensitive or vulnerable in network environments. Please > review the Security Considerations for dependent YANG modules > for information as to which nodes may be considered sensitive > or vulnerable in network environments. > > This is important because the “cleartext-key” and “cleartext-private-key” > leafs come from groupings defined in the crypto-types draft: > > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-27#section-2.1.4.3 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-27#section-2.1.4.5 > > And that draft’s Security Considerations sections says: > > 3.7. Cleartext Passwords and Keys > > The module contained within this document enables, only when specific > "feature" statements are enabled, for the cleartext value of passwords > and keys to be stored in the configuration database. Storing cleartext > values for passwords and keys is NOT RECOMMENDED. > > All good? Yes, I think that's sufficient. >> Section 5 (Security Considerations): >> Given the sensitive nature of the data stored using this model, I suggest >> another pass at this section following RFC 3552 (BCP 72): Are there >> any other >> possible attacks on confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, or >> availability, >> which are in scope for this section? Is there any specific threat >> model that >> needs to be considered? I also suggest naming some of the possible >> impacts of >> these attacks. Some possible impacts seem obvious, but I wonder if >> I'm missing >> any significant impacts because I'm not very familiar with the model. > > IDK either. But I can say that this draft has had two SecDir reviews. > I’m happy to email or get on a call to discuss with interested parties > at anytime. Ok. I don't have any specific suggestions and I'll defer to the security experts here. >> Section 5.3: >> "access control mechanisms like NACM SHOULD be used to limit access >> to the >> key's secret data to only the most trusted authorized clients (e.g., an >> organization’s crypto officer)." Does "client" refer to a person >> here, rather >> than the RFC 6241 definition of client, which the document says it >> uses? If so, >> I suggest finding a different term here. > > Client refers to RFC 6241’s definition of client. But that client > authenticates > itself to the server using credentials that may, e.g., belong to an > organization’s > crypto officer. I did this: > > s/an organization’s/belonging to an organizations’s/??? > > Is it better? Yes, that helps, thank you. >> Nits/editorial comments: >> >> Section 5.1: >> "The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a >> "keystore" that, by its name, suggests that it will protect its >> contents from >> unauthorized disclosure and modification." This might be semantics, >> but: In my >> mind, the name suggests that there's sensitive data, which implies >> that the >> data needs to be protected, with obvious consequences otherwise. Please >> consider rephrasing this sentence. > > I get what you’re saying, but turning the sentence around like that > seems to > misplace the emphasis, e.g., the draft isn’t about the data but the > mechanism. > At least I couldn’t see how to do it. Can you suggest specific > replacement text? Maybe just simplify it as follows? "The YANG module defined in this document defines a mechanism called a "keystore" that will protect its contents from unauthorized disclosure and modification. That said, I won't insist on this editorial change, I'd be okay with leaving the text as is if you think that's better. Thanks, Reese
- [netconf] Genart last call review of draft-ietf-n… Reese Enghardt via Datatracker
- Re: [netconf] Genart last call review of draft-ie… Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] Genart last call review of draft-ie… Reese Enghardt
- Re: [netconf] [Last-Call] Genart last call review… Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] [Last-Call] Genart last call review… Reese Enghardt