[Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of nonce OSCP & TLS & NTP4+
Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> Mon, 16 January 2023 07:20 UTC
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Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 08:20:37 +0100
From: Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
To: duke.abbaddon@gmail.com, "ntp@ietf.org" <ntp@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of nonce OSCP & TLS & NTP4+
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Sorry, ist this ChatGPT now writing to a mailing list? I completely miss the context and purpose of this and the following messages... Regards, Ulrich >>> Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> schrieb am 12.01.2023 um 20:20 in Nachricht <CAHpNFcMk0t6c4mCt9m5-sqg7S4rLRzkerSi1Sq-PaMz-1ijj-g@mail.gmail.com>: > ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS > > "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension > of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not > weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." > > GEA-2 > GEA-3 is therefor 64Bit Safe (Mobile calls) & 128Bit Safe > (Reasonable security) > SHA2, SHA3therefor 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security Mobile) ++ > AES & PolyChaCha both provide a premise of 128Bit++ > > So by reason alone GEA has a place in our hearts. > > * > > ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS https://is.gd/CryptographicProves > > ICE-SSRTP constitutes 2 parts: > > The nonce: Time Value Inverted Nonce Packet: Obfuscation > The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP > Classifications > > * > In the case of Audio & Video; The Nonce is transmitted per frame group > & displaces the content in the correct manner > In the case of Data; Per group of packets > * > > Nonce ICE-SSRTP: > > Time Value Inverted ICE-SSRTP (c)Rupert S > The Nonce Variable > > Needed content list > > Time inverted : Value T: > > Consisting of T(time) Tick(How many seconds), > Variable Inversion of content though FFT & Variable reversal of nonce > & main Enciphered package > > Encryption methods: > > Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) > Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) > Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit > (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) > > Methods of obfuscation: > > Packet swap (order) > Inversion (Data & band, Data Band order(High/Low) > Time Variable addition to Nonce &or Data > > Compression of packet with nonce decompression list: BZip, GZip, LHZ > > Main Core Accelerated Encryption Blocks: > > GEA (all version) & bit depth > CHACHA20-POLY1305 > AES > GCM : CCM : CBC > > Value T : Nonce { Packet A : Packet B : Packet C } T = Inversion of 1 > = { Nonce : Packet Order : Content } > Value of Nonce = { Noise Removal (wavelet) : Bit Addition : Byte Order } > > ***** > > Nonce reasoning : Dual Cypher : RS > Larger packets (Hardware Decrypt), Smaller Encrypted nonce (CPU Processed) > > By the nonce we can therefor obfuscate the content of the Cryptic packet > > For examples: > > Nonce = Elliptic Noise > Packets are noisy > > Nonce = Swap > Packets are swapped in order > > Nonce = Bit addition / Byte swap > We do maths on the solved packets > > Nonce = Banding arrangements > We swap bands in the Audio & Video Data > > Nonce = Inversion > We invert the packets > before or after processing > > * > > Main Cypher Package : ICE-SSRTP > > The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP > Classifications > > Encryption methods: > > Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt) > Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt) > Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit > (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt) > > Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption > > * > > ICE-SSRTP Block Compressed Encipher > > ICE-SSRTP Encryption uses 2 Attributes & on the whole compression does > not affect security of the Encipher. > > Nonce 16Bit/32Bit AES/GEA > Compression header (Encrypted) > Main Block (Block compressed with header & then lightly Encipher) (*3 or 4) > > The header keeps the Data compressed a secret & is useful for EXE & > DLL because headers auto load exe's in the right order. > > Refer to Code-Speed & ICE-SSRTP > > * > > Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function: > > "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying > the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics > allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ > > So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct > time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the > telephone network would not change the time!" > > So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from > the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival > time so that when you get the correct time; It still works! > > In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify > link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5 > Minutes... > > You can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is > timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until... > > That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work. > > RS > > * > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html > > Code Speed > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html > > Chaos > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html > > sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ > > RSA-PSS > RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix > RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) > > https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 > > PSK: > Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois > Counter Mode > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ > > Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP > Nonce is compatible) > https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt > > AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ > > Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP > https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ > https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 > > AES-GCM SRTP > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ > AES-CCM > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ > > Compact TLS 1.3 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ > DTLS 2023 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ > TLS 1.2 > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ > > Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ > > https://is.gd/SecurityHSM > https://is.gd/WebPKI > > * > ICE-SSRTP is relatively simple & involves a Dual Cypher of many > classifications > AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as > UDP & TCP & GRE > > ICE-SSRTP is useful for: > > TV & Satellite encoding & decryption > Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding > Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications > such as UDP & TCP & GRE > 3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding > Radio & Telecoms > > * > > In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) : > 64Bit AES/3DES/GEA with ICE-SSRTP Nonce makes perfect sense. > > In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) : > > Both the 64Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO + AES-NE + > Advance Crypto Instruction ACI, > 96Bit/128Bit AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP > > In Terms of larger demands: With 64Bit/128Bit Instruction-set & the > 32Bit SiMD/NANO/AVX128Bit+, + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI > > 96Bit * 5 /128Bit/256Bit/384Bit *3 AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce > ICE-SSRTP > > * > > ***** > > ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS > > IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure can help heal GPRS+ 3G+ 4G+ 5G+ > > Time NTP Protocols : is usable in 2G+ <> 5G+LTE Network SIM > > ICE-SSRTP Encryption AES,Blake2, Poly ChaCha, SM4, SHA2, SHA3, GEA-1 and > GEA-2 > 'Ideal for USB Dongle & Radio' in Rust RS ' Ideal for Quality TPM > Implementation' > > "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension > of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not > weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." > > IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol > > Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... > > Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the > result. > > Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? > > * > > Time differentiated : Interleave, Inversion & differentiating Elliptic curve. > > We will be able to know and test the Cypher : PRINCIPLE OF INTENT TO TRUST > > We know of a cypher but : (Principle RS) > > We blend the cypher.. > Interleaved pages of a cypher obfuscate : PAL CScam does this > > Timed : Theoretically unique to you in principle for imprecision, But > we cannot really have imprecise in Crypto! > > But we can have a set time & in effect Elliptic curve a transient variable T, > With this, Interleave the resulting pages (RAM Buffer Concept) > > Invert them over Time Var = T > > We can do all & principally this is relatively simple. > > (c)RS > > * > > Modulus Dual Encrypt & Decrypt package : Processor feature (c)RS > > AES-CCM & AES-GCM & Other Cypher Modulus + CCM & GCM can be > accelerated with a joint AES Crypto module, > > Processor feature & package : Module list: > > 2 Decryption pipelines working in parallel, > With a Shared cache & RAM Module > Modulus & Semi-parallel modulating decryption & Encryption combined > with Encapsulation Cypher IP Protocol packet > > Parallax Cryptographic Processing Unit: RS > > The capacity To Multiply decryption on specific hardware in situations > such as lower Bit precision is to be implemented as follows: > > On AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic processors; In particular PSP+PPS(ARM+) & SiMD > .. > > The capacity to exploit the fact that the nonce is 16Bit to 64Bit & > full float upto 128Bit for legal decryption (client) means there is a > simple method to use: > > In situations that a AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic unit can process 2 > threads on a 256Bit Function we can do both the main 128Bit/192Bit & > the nonce 16Bit to 64Bit & Enable a single instruction Roll to > Synchronise both The main HASH & Nonce. > > AES & Crypto hardware can utilise the CPU/GPU/Processor FPU & SiMD to > decrypt the nonce (smaller so fast) & in the same 8bto to 64Bits of > code; Inline & parallax the cryptographic function. > > With a 256Bit AES-NI & Cryptographic unit : Parallel Decryption & > Return Encryption by using 2x 128Bit & a Processor Enciphered Nonce. > > * > Security Relevant Extensions > SVM : Elliptic Curves & Polynomial graphs & function > AES : Advanced Encryption Standard Functions > AVX : 32Bit to 256Bit parallel Vector Mathematics > FPU : IEEE Float Maths > F16b : 16Bit to 32Bit Standards Floats > RDTSCP : Very high precision time & stamp > > Processor features: fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr > pge mca cmov pat pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 htt pni ssse3 fma > cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes f16c syscall nx lm avx svm sse4a osvw > ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 tce tbm topx page1gb rdtscp bmi1 > > 32Bit SiMD Operations Available on AVX Per Cycle (A Thought on why > 32Bit operations are good!) > (8Cores)8*32Bit SiMD(AVX) * 6(times per cycle) * 3600Mhz = 1,382,400 > Operations Per Second > > AES & Elliptic Hardware Acceleration : AES & SVM along with AVX > Micro-block decoding. > > ECC Elliptic Curve encrypt is 20% to 40% more efficient than Large > Size RSA AES on game packets @ QUICC > 512/384/256 AES Elliptic is clearly advantageous because of > compression block size on small network packets, > > Larger streams such as video clearly favour 2048 Bit RSA AES; With SVM > Elliptic feature, > > RSA,512, 384 AES Elliptic curve is a clear winner! > > * > > (c)Rupert S > > *reference* > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html > > Performance Comparison of AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption Modes > http://worldcomp-proceedings.com/proc/p2016/SAM9746.pdf > > Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC, > OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS > https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf > > * > > Example Encryption Results: > > gnutls-cli --benchmark-tls-ciphers > > Testing throughput in cipher/MAC combinations (payload: 1400 bytes) > > AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec > AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec > AES-128-CCM - TLS1.2 185.36 MB/sec > AES-128-CCM - TLS1.3 182.74 MB/sec > CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.2 112.79 MB/sec > CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.3 111.61 MB/sec > AES-128-CBC - TLS1.0 168.16 MB/sec > CAMELLIA-128-CBC - TLS1.0 53.82 MB/sec > GOST28147-TC26Z-CNT - TLS1.2 15.39 MB/sec > > As can be seen: > > AES-GCM is > 1056x better than Camellia & > 508x Better than ChaChaPoly > 309x Better than AES-CCM > > So what about ChaChaGCM? > > RS > > * > > Example of use: > > Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade > marker > > Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity.. > Interleaved channel BAND. > > Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit > Coprocessor digital channel selector & > > channel Key selection based on unique.. > > Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular) > > All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with > micro band tuning firmware. > > (c)Rupert S > > * > > Good for cables ? and noise ? > > Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables > <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> > > So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple > question but we have, > > SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help > us? > > In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion > does help alleviate ... > > Transistor emission fatigue... > > IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol > > Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... > > Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the > result. > > Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? > > Good for cables ? and noise ? > > Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes > Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> > > (c) Rupert S > > * > Given the ZFS Results the strategy to utilize (c)RS > > Crypto Storage & RAM Strategy (c)RS > > GCM : Accelerated by SVM Elliptic Curve & AES & ARM Crypto-Extensions, > Processor Compression Accelerated, > > 2 to 64 Blocks, > Header Separated; GZIP, BZip & LZ8 & LZH & Wavelet & Hardware > Compression with independent Encrypted Segmentation & Sub-Grouping. > > Hash main block group listing & Tables for drive repair and DIR & > Access Acceleration. > > https://www.medo64.com/content/media/ubuntu-2204-zfs-speed.png > AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec > AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec > * > > https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/monticarlo-workload-selector.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/security-aspect-leaf-hash-identifiers.ht > ml > > > Audio, Visual & Bluetooth & Headset & mobile developments only go so far: > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/visual-acuity-of-eye-replacements.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/ihmtes.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/eccd-vr-3datmos-enhanced-codec.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/12/3d-audio-plugin.html > > Integral to Telecoms Security TRNG > > *RAND OP Ubuntu : > https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/pollinate.1.html > > https://pollinate.n-helix.com > > * > > ***** Dukes Of THRUST ****** > > Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade > markerz > > Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity.. > Interleaved channel BAND. > > Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit > Coprocessor digital channel selector & > > channel Key selection based on unique.. > > Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular) > > All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with > micro band tuning firmware. > > (c)Rupert S > > Dev/Random : Importance > > Dev/Random : Importance : Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software > implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and > GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random > > Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits > (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we > will improve with our /Dev/Random > > We can improve GPRS 2G to 5G networks still need to save power, GPRS > Doubles a phones capacity to run all day, > > Code can and will be improved, Proposals include: > > Blake2 > ChaCha > SM4 > SHA2 > SHA3 > > Elliptic Encipher > AES > Poly ChaCha > > Firstly we need a good solid & stable /dev/random > > So we can examine the issue with a true SEED! > > Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html > > TRNG Samples & Method DRAND Proud! > > https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b_Sl1oI7qTlc6__ihLt-N601nyLsY7QU/view?usp=d > rive_web > https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yi4ERt0xdPc9ooh9vWrPY1LV_eXV-1Wc/view?usp=d > rive_web > https://drive.google.com/file/d/11dKUNl0ngouSIJzOD92lO546tfGwC0tu/view?usp=d > rive_web > https://drive.google.com/file/d/10a0E4Gh5S-itzBVh0fOaxS7JS9ru-68T/view?usp=d > rive_web > > https://github.com/P1sec/gea-implementation > > "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension > of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not > weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers." > > "A stream cipher, such as the well-known RC4 or GEA-1, usually works > through using the Xor operation against a plaintext. The Xor operation > being symmetrical, this means that encrypting should be considered the > same operation as decrypting: GEA-1 and GEA-2 are basically > pseudo-random data generators, taking a seed (the key, IV and > direction bit of the GPRS data, which are concatenated), > > The generated random data (the keystream) is xored with the clear-text > data (the plaintext) for encrypting. Then, later, the keystream is > xored with the encrypted data (the ciphertext) for decrypting. That is > why the functions called in the target library for decrypting and > encrypting are the same. > > GEA-1 and GEA-2 are bit-oriented, unlike RC4 which is byte-oriented, > because their algorithms generate only one bit of pseudo-random data > at once (derived from their internal state), while algorithms like RC4 > generate no less than one byte at once (in RC4's case, derived from > > permutation done in its internal state). Even though the keystream > bits are put together by the current encryption / decryption C and > Rust libraries into bytes in order to generate usable keystream, > obviously. > > Based on this, you can understand that GEA-1 and GEA-2 are LFSR: > Linear Feedback Shift Register-oriented ciphers, because their > internal state is stored into fixed-size registers. This includes the > S and W registers which serve for initialization / key scheduling > purposes and are respectively 64 and 97-bit wide registers, and the A, > B, C (and for GEA-2 only D) registers which serve for the purpose of > keystream generation, which are respectively 31, 32, 33 and 29-bit > wide registers. > > On each iteration of the keystream generation, each register is > bit-wise rotated by one position, while the bit being rotated from the > left towards the right side (or conversely depending on in which bit > order you internally represent your registers) is fed back to the > algorithm and mutated depending on given conditions. Hence, the > > shifted-out bit is derived from other processing, and reinserted, > while being for this reason possibly flipped depending on conditions > depending on bits present at the other side of the given register. > > This is the explanation for the name of linear feedback shift register > (shift because of the shift operation required for the rotation, and > linear feedback because of the constant-time transform operation > involved). > > The rest of the register may also be mutated at each iteration steps, > as in the case of the GEA-1 and 2, whole fixed Xor sequences (which > differ for each register) may be applied depending on whether the > rotated bit is a 0 or a 1. > > Note that a step where the register iterates is called clocking (the > register is clocked), and that the fixed points where the register may > be Xor'ed when the rotated bit becomes a 1 are called taps. The linear > function which may transmute the rotated bit at the clocking step > (taking several bits of the original register as an input) is called > the F function. > > Those kind of bit-oriented LFSR algorithms, such as GEA-1 and 2 (for > GPRS) and A5/1 and 2 (for GSM), were designed this way for optimal > hardware implementations in the late 80's and early 90's." > > ***** > > IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol > > Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... > > Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the > result. > > Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? > > Good for cables ? and noise ? > > Presenting : IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables > <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> > > So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple > question but we have, > > SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help > us? > > In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion > does help alleviate ... > > Transistor emission fatigue... > > IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol > > Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ... > > Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the > result. > > Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption? > > Good for cables ? and noise ? > > Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes > Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band> > > (c) Rupert S > > > ***** Dukes Of THRUST ****** > > Autism, Deafness & the hard of hearing : In need of ANC & Active audio > clarification or correction 2022-01 > > Sony & a few others make noise cancelling headphones that are suitable > for people with Acute disfunction to brain function for ear drums ... > Attention deficit or Autism, > The newer Sony headsets are theoretically enablers of a clear > confusion free world for Autistic people.. > Reaching out to a larger audience of people simply annoyed by a > confusing world; While they listen to music.. > Can and does protect a small percentage of people who are confused & > harassed by major discord located in all jurisdictions of life... > > Crazy noise levels, Or simply drowned in HISSING Static: > > Search for active voice enhanced noise cancellation today. > > Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com > > > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html > > https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/noise-violation-technology-bluetooth.htm > l > > > https://www.orosound.com/ > > https://www.consumerreports.org/noise-canceling-headphone/best-noise-canceli > ng-headphones-of-the-year-a1166868524/
- [Ntp] full doc ntp (because of nonce OSCP & TLS &… Duke Abbaddon
- [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of nonce … Ulrich Windl
- Re: [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of no… Salz, Rich