[Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of nonce OSCP & TLS & NTP4+

Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de> Mon, 16 January 2023 07:20 UTC

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Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 08:20:37 +0100
From: Ulrich Windl <Ulrich.Windl@rz.uni-regensburg.de>
To: duke.abbaddon@gmail.com, "ntp@ietf.org" <ntp@ietf.org>
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Subject: [Ntp] Antw: [EXT] full doc ntp (because of nonce OSCP & TLS & NTP4+
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Sorry,

ist this ChatGPT now writing to a mailing list? I completely miss the context and purpose of this and the following messages...

Regards,
Ulrich

>>> Duke Abbaddon <duke.abbaddon@gmail.com> schrieb am 12.01.2023 um 20:20 in
Nachricht
<CAHpNFcMk0t6c4mCt9m5-sqg7S4rLRzkerSi1Sq-PaMz-1ijj-g@mail.gmail.com>:
> ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS
> 
> "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
> of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
> weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
> 
> GEA-2 > GEA-3 is therefor 64Bit Safe (Mobile calls) & 128Bit Safe
> (Reasonable security)
> SHA2, SHA3therefor 128Bit Safe (Reasonable security Mobile) ++
> AES & PolyChaCha both provide a premise of 128Bit++
> 
> So by reason alone GEA has a place in our hearts.
> 
> *
> 
> ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS https://is.gd/CryptographicProves 
> 
> ICE-SSRTP constitutes 2 parts:
> 
> The nonce: Time Value Inverted Nonce Packet: Obfuscation
> The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP 
> Classifications
> 
> *
> In the case of Audio & Video; The Nonce is transmitted per frame group
> & displaces the content in the correct manner
> In the case of Data; Per group of packets
> *
> 
> Nonce ICE-SSRTP:
> 
> Time Value Inverted ICE-SSRTP (c)Rupert S
> The Nonce Variable
> 
> Needed content list
> 
> Time inverted : Value T:
> 
> Consisting of T(time) Tick(How many seconds),
> Variable Inversion of content though FFT & Variable reversal of nonce
> & main Enciphered package
> 
> Encryption methods:
> 
> Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt)
> Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt)
> Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit
> (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt)
> 
> Methods of obfuscation:
> 
> Packet swap (order)
> Inversion (Data & band, Data Band order(High/Low)
> Time Variable addition to Nonce &or Data
> 
> Compression of packet with nonce decompression list: BZip, GZip, LHZ
> 
> Main Core Accelerated Encryption Blocks:
> 
> GEA (all version) & bit depth
> CHACHA20-POLY1305
> AES
> GCM : CCM : CBC
> 
> Value T : Nonce { Packet A : Packet B : Packet C } T = Inversion of 1
> =  { Nonce : Packet Order : Content }
> Value of Nonce = { Noise Removal (wavelet) : Bit Addition : Byte Order }
> 
> *****
> 
> Nonce reasoning : Dual Cypher : RS
> Larger packets (Hardware Decrypt), Smaller Encrypted nonce (CPU Processed)
> 
> By the nonce we can therefor obfuscate the content of the Cryptic packet
> 
> For examples:
> 
> Nonce = Elliptic Noise
> Packets are noisy
> 
> Nonce = Swap
> Packets are swapped in order
> 
> Nonce = Bit addition / Byte swap
> We do maths on the solved packets
> 
> Nonce = Banding arrangements
> We swap bands in the Audio & Video Data
> 
> Nonce = Inversion
> We invert the packets
> before or after processing
> 
> *
> 
> Main Cypher Package : ICE-SSRTP
> 
> The Main Cypher: AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP 
> Classifications
> 
> Encryption methods:
> 
> Bit length Nonce : 16Bit & 32Bit (SiMD decrypt)
> Bit length Main Encryption Packet : 32Bit, 48Bit, 64Bit (SiMD decrypt)
> Bit length Main Encryption Packet H : 64Bit, 96Bit, 128Bit
> (TPM/Security unit/SiMD decrypt)
> 
> Refer to Nonce ICE-SSRTP for packet dual Decryption/Encryption
> 
> *
> 
> ICE-SSRTP Block Compressed Encipher
> 
> ICE-SSRTP Encryption uses 2 Attributes & on the whole compression does
> not affect security of the Encipher.
> 
> Nonce 16Bit/32Bit AES/GEA
> Compression header (Encrypted)
> Main Block (Block compressed with header & then lightly Encipher) (*3 or 4)
> 
> The header keeps the Data compressed a secret & is useful for EXE &
> DLL because headers auto load exe's in the right order.
> 
> Refer to Code-Speed & ICE-SSRTP
> 
> *
> 
> Correct Time : EEC Elliptic & Nonce timer function:
> 
> "The thing about random unique nonce with :dev/rng is that verifying
> the nonce's uniqueness is an issue, with SSRTP nonce, Time intrinsics
> allow only one play time https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ 
> 
> So what about if they have a reset phone & have not got the correct
> time ? mine wouldn't do NTP until i set it to pools.ntp.org, the
> telephone network would not change the time!"
> 
> So the nonce may need a seconds from arrival timer; So that it is from
> the time it arrives (in your terms) & additionally a sent and arrival
> time so that when you get the correct time; It still works!
> 
> In essence TLS & OSCP need a time from arrival (to verify
> link/Security CRT), It does not matter if that NTP timer is off by 5
> Minutes...
> 
> You can use the Time related EEC Elliptic curve & as long as it is
> timed from arrival & sends back a sample with a from time & until...
> 
> That EEC Elliptic & Nonce will work.
> 
> RS
> 
> *
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html 
> 
> Code Speed
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/08/simd.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/09/ovccans.html 
> 
> Chaos
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2020/06/cryptoseed.html 
> 
> sRTP Chaos Nonce: Certificate transactions; TLS & OCSP Security Protocols
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8954/ 
> 
> RSA-PSS
> RSASSA-PSS is a probabilistic signature scheme (PSS) with appendix
> RSAES-OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding)
> 
> https://www.cryptosys.net/pki/manpki/pki_rsaschemes.html 
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8017 
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5756 
> 
> PSK:
> Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois
> Counter Mode
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5487/ 
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8442/ 
> 
> Nonce & Plaintext, Token & SequenceID (Bearing in mind that ICE-SSRTP
> Nonce is compatible)
> https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-howard-gssapi-aead-01.txt 
> 
> AES-GCM-SIV: Nonce Misuse-Resistant Authenticated Encryption
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8452/ 
> 
> Adding the nonce to GMAC makes GMAC's unique : ICE-ssRTP
> https://www.zerotier.com/2019/09/04/aes-gmac-ctr-siv/ 
> https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5297#page-15 
> 
> AES-GCM SRTP
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc7714/ 
> AES-CCM
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6655/ 
> 
> Compact TLS 1.3
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ctls/ 
> DTLS 2023
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tsvwg-dtls-over-sctp-bis/ 
> TLS 1.2
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5246/ 
> 
> Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc5905/ 
> 
> https://is.gd/SecurityHSM 
> https://is.gd/WebPKI 
> 
> *
> ICE-SSRTP is relatively simple & involves a Dual Cypher of many 
> classifications
> AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications such as
> UDP & TCP & GRE
> 
> ICE-SSRTP is useful for:
> 
> TV & Satellite encoding & decryption
> Messaging applications; Video & Call Encoding
> Improved AES, CHACHA20-POLY1305, GEA, 3DES & Other RTP Classifications
> such as UDP & TCP & GRE
> 3G, 4G LTE & 5G Encoding
> Radio & Telecoms
> 
> *
> 
> In terms of lightweight security (Bluetooth ear-buds & other tiny things) :
> 64Bit AES/3DES/GEA with ICE-SSRTP Nonce makes perfect sense.
> 
> In Terms of heavier (in terms of ARM Core Phones & Network-boxes) :
> 
> Both the 64Bit Instruction-set & the 32Bit SiMD/NANO + AES-NE +
> Advance Crypto Instruction ACI,
> 96Bit/128Bit AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce ICE-SSRTP
> 
> In Terms of larger demands: With 64Bit/128Bit Instruction-set & the
> 32Bit SiMD/NANO/AVX128Bit+, + AES-NE + Advance Crypto Instruction ACI
> 
> 96Bit * 5 /128Bit/256Bit/384Bit *3 AES/3DES/GEA * 3 Packets per nonce 
> ICE-SSRTP
> 
> *
> 
> *****
> 
> ICE-SSRTP GEA Replacement 2022 + (c)RS
> 
> IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure can help heal GPRS+ 3G+ 4G+ 5G+
> 
> Time NTP Protocols : is usable in 2G+ <> 5G+LTE Network SIM
> 
> ICE-SSRTP Encryption AES,Blake2, Poly ChaCha, SM4, SHA2, SHA3, GEA-1 and 
> GEA-2
> 'Ideal for USB Dongle & Radio' in Rust RS ' Ideal for Quality TPM
> Implementation'
> 
> "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
> of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
> weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
> 
> IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
> 
> Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
> 
> Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the 
> result.
> 
> Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
> 
> *
> 
> Time differentiated : Interleave, Inversion & differentiating Elliptic curve.
> 
> We will be able to know and test the Cypher : PRINCIPLE OF INTENT TO TRUST
> 
> We know of a cypher but : (Principle RS)
> 
> We blend the cypher..
> Interleaved pages of a cypher obfuscate : PAL CScam does this
> 
> Timed : Theoretically unique to you in principle for imprecision, But
> we cannot really have imprecise in Crypto!
> 
> But we can have a set time & in effect Elliptic curve a transient variable T,
> With this, Interleave the resulting pages (RAM Buffer Concept)
> 
> Invert them over Time Var = T
> 
> We can do all & principally this is relatively simple.
> 
> (c)RS
> 
> *
> 
> Modulus Dual Encrypt & Decrypt package : Processor feature (c)RS
> 
> AES-CCM & AES-GCM & Other Cypher Modulus + CCM & GCM can be
> accelerated with a joint AES Crypto module,
> 
> Processor feature & package : Module list:
> 
> 2 Decryption pipelines working in parallel,
> With a Shared cache & RAM Module
> Modulus & Semi-parallel modulating decryption & Encryption combined
> with Encapsulation Cypher IP Protocol packet
> 
> Parallax Cryptographic Processing Unit: RS
> 
> The capacity To Multiply decryption on specific hardware in situations
> such as lower Bit precision is to be implemented as follows:
> 
> On AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic processors; In particular PSP+PPS(ARM+) & SiMD 
> ..
> 
> The capacity to exploit the fact that the nonce is 16Bit to 64Bit &
> full float upto 128Bit for legal decryption (client) means there is a
> simple method to use:
> 
> In situations that a AES-NI & ARM Cryptographic unit can process 2
> threads on a 256Bit Function we can do both the main 128Bit/192Bit &
> the nonce 16Bit to 64Bit & Enable a single instruction Roll to
> Synchronise both The main HASH & Nonce.
> 
> AES & Crypto hardware can utilise the CPU/GPU/Processor FPU & SiMD to
> decrypt the nonce (smaller so fast) & in the same 8bto to 64Bits of
> code; Inline & parallax the cryptographic function.
> 
> With a 256Bit AES-NI & Cryptographic unit : Parallel Decryption &
> Return Encryption by using 2x 128Bit & a Processor Enciphered Nonce.
> 
> *
> Security Relevant Extensions
> SVM : Elliptic Curves & Polynomial graphs & function
> AES : Advanced Encryption Standard Functions
> AVX : 32Bit to 256Bit parallel Vector Mathematics
> FPU : IEEE Float Maths
> F16b : 16Bit to 32Bit Standards Floats
> RDTSCP : Very high precision time & stamp
> 
> Processor features: fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr
> pge mca cmov pat pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 htt pni ssse3 fma
> cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes f16c syscall nx lm avx svm sse4a osvw
> ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 tce tbm topx page1gb rdtscp bmi1
> 
> 32Bit SiMD Operations Available on AVX Per Cycle (A Thought on why
> 32Bit operations are good!)
> (8Cores)8*32Bit SiMD(AVX) * 6(times per cycle) * 3600Mhz = 1,382,400
> Operations Per Second
> 
> AES & Elliptic Hardware Acceleration : AES & SVM along with AVX
> Micro-block decoding.
> 
> ECC Elliptic Curve encrypt is 20% to 40% more efficient than Large
> Size RSA AES on game packets @ QUICC
> 512/384/256 AES Elliptic is clearly advantageous because of
> compression block size on small network packets,
> 
> Larger streams such as video clearly favour 2048 Bit RSA AES; With SVM
> Elliptic feature,
> 
> RSA,512, 384 AES Elliptic curve is a clear winner!
> 
> *
> 
> (c)Rupert S
> 
> *reference*
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/01/ntp.html 
> 
> Performance Comparison of AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption Modes
> http://worldcomp-proceedings.com/proc/p2016/SAM9746.pdf 
> 
> Basic comparison of Modes for Authenticated-Encryption -IAPM, XCBC,
> OCB, CCM, EAX, CWC, GCM, PCFB, CS
> https://www.fi.muni.cz/~xsvenda/docs/AE_comparison_ipics04.pdf 
> 
> *
> 
> Example Encryption Results:
> 
> gnutls-cli --benchmark-tls-ciphers
> 
> Testing throughput in cipher/MAC combinations (payload: 1400 bytes)
> 
> AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
> AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
> AES-128-CCM - TLS1.2 185.36 MB/sec
> AES-128-CCM - TLS1.3 182.74 MB/sec
> CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.2 112.79 MB/sec
> CHACHA20-POLY1305 - TLS1.3 111.61 MB/sec
> AES-128-CBC - TLS1.0 168.16 MB/sec
> CAMELLIA-128-CBC - TLS1.0 53.82 MB/sec
> GOST28147-TC26Z-CNT - TLS1.2 15.39 MB/sec
> 
> As can be seen:
> 
> AES-GCM is
> 1056x better than Camellia &
> 508x Better than ChaChaPoly
> 309x Better than AES-CCM
> 
> So what about ChaChaGCM?
> 
> RS
> 
> *
> 
> Example of use:
> 
> Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade 
> marker
> 
> Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
> Interleaved channel BAND.
> 
> Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
> Coprocessor digital channel selector &
> 
> channel Key selection based on unique..
> 
> Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
> 
> All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
> micro band tuning firmware.
> 
> (c)Rupert S
> 
> *
> 
> Good for cables ? and noise ?
> 
> Presenting :  IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables
> <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
> 
> So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple
> question but we have,
> 
> SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help 
> us?
> 
> In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion
> does help alleviate ...
> 
> Transistor emission fatigue...
> 
> IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
> 
> Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
> 
> Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the 
> result.
> 
> Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
> 
> Good for cables ? and noise ?
> 
> Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes
> Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
> 
> (c) Rupert S
> 
> *
> Given the ZFS Results the strategy to utilize (c)RS
> 
> Crypto Storage & RAM Strategy (c)RS
> 
> GCM : Accelerated by SVM Elliptic Curve & AES & ARM Crypto-Extensions,
> Processor Compression Accelerated,
> 
> 2 to 64 Blocks,
> Header Separated; GZIP, BZip & LZ8 & LZH & Wavelet & Hardware
> Compression with independent Encrypted Segmentation & Sub-Grouping.
> 
> Hash main block group listing & Tables for drive repair and DIR &
> Access Acceleration.
> 
> https://www.medo64.com/content/media/ubuntu-2204-zfs-speed.png 
> AES-128-GCM - TLS1.2 0.56 GB/sec
> AES-128-GCM - TLS1.3 0.57 GB/sec
> *
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2018/12/rng.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/rdseed.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2017/04/rng-and-random-web.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/monticarlo-workload-selector.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/security-aspect-leaf-hash-identifiers.ht 
> ml
> 
> 
> Audio, Visual & Bluetooth & Headset & mobile developments only go so far:
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/visual-acuity-of-eye-replacements.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2022/03/ice-ssrtp.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/ihmtes.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/eccd-vr-3datmos-enhanced-codec.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/12/3d-audio-plugin.html 
> 
> Integral to Telecoms Security TRNG
> 
> *RAND OP Ubuntu :
> https://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/trusty/man1/pollinate.1.html 
> 
> https://pollinate.n-helix.com 
> 
> *
> 
> ***** Dukes Of THRUST ******
> 
> Nostalgic TriBand : Independence RADIO : Send : Receive :Rebel-you trade 
> markerz
> 
> Nostalgic TriBand 5hz banding 2 to 5 bands, Close proximity..
> Interleaved channel BAND.
> 
> Microchip clock and 50Mhz Risc Rio processor : 8Bit : 16Bit : 18Bit
> Coprocessor digital channel selector &
> 
> channel Key selection based on unique..
> 
> Crystal time Quartz with Synced Tick (Regulated & modular)
> 
> All digital interface and resistor ring channel & sync selector with
> micro band tuning firmware.
> 
> (c)Rupert S
> 
> Dev/Random : Importance
> 
> Dev/Random : Importance : Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software
> implementation of 3 Bits (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and
> GEA-2 Implementations we will improve with our /Dev/Random
> 
> Our C/T/RNG Can Help GEA-2 Open Software implementation of 3 Bits
> (T/RNG) Not 1 : We need Chaos : GEA-1 and GEA-2 Implementations we
> will improve with our /Dev/Random
> 
> We can improve GPRS 2G to 5G networks still need to save power, GPRS
> Doubles a phones capacity to run all day,
> 
> Code can and will be improved, Proposals include:
> 
> Blake2
> ChaCha
> SM4
> SHA2
> SHA3
> 
> Elliptic Encipher
> AES
> Poly ChaCha
> 
> Firstly we need a good solid & stable /dev/random
> 
> So we can examine the issue with a true SEED!
> 
> Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com/2022/02/interrupt-entropy.html 
> 
> TRNG Samples & Method DRAND Proud!
> 
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1b_Sl1oI7qTlc6__ihLt-N601nyLsY7QU/view?usp=d 
> rive_web
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/1yi4ERt0xdPc9ooh9vWrPY1LV_eXV-1Wc/view?usp=d 
> rive_web
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/11dKUNl0ngouSIJzOD92lO546tfGwC0tu/view?usp=d 
> rive_web
> https://drive.google.com/file/d/10a0E4Gh5S-itzBVh0fOaxS7JS9ru-68T/view?usp=d 
> rive_web
> 
> https://github.com/P1sec/gea-implementation 
> 
> "GEA-1 and GEA-2, which are very similar (GEA-2 is just an extension
> of GEA-1 with a higher amount of processing, and apparently not
> weakened) are bit-oriented stream ciphers."
> 
> "A stream cipher, such as the well-known RC4 or GEA-1, usually works
> through using the Xor operation against a plaintext. The Xor operation
> being symmetrical, this means that encrypting should be considered the
> same operation as decrypting: GEA-1 and GEA-2 are basically
> pseudo-random data generators, taking a seed (the key, IV and
> direction bit of the GPRS data, which are concatenated),
> 
> The generated random data (the keystream) is xored with the clear-text
> data (the plaintext) for encrypting. Then, later, the keystream is
> xored with the encrypted data (the ciphertext) for decrypting. That is
> why the functions called in the target library for decrypting and
> encrypting are the same.
> 
> GEA-1 and GEA-2 are bit-oriented, unlike RC4 which is byte-oriented,
> because their algorithms generate only one bit of pseudo-random data
> at once (derived from their internal state), while algorithms like RC4
> generate no less than one byte at once (in RC4's case, derived from
> 
> permutation done in its internal state). Even though the keystream
> bits are put together by the current encryption / decryption C and
> Rust libraries into bytes in order to generate usable keystream,
> obviously.
> 
> Based on this, you can understand that GEA-1 and GEA-2 are LFSR:
> Linear Feedback Shift Register-oriented ciphers, because their
> internal state is stored into fixed-size registers. This includes the
> S and W registers which serve for initialization / key scheduling
> purposes and are respectively 64 and 97-bit wide registers, and the A,
> B, C (and for GEA-2 only D) registers which serve for the purpose of
> keystream generation, which are respectively 31, 32, 33 and 29-bit
> wide registers.
> 
> On each iteration of the keystream generation, each register is
> bit-wise rotated by one position, while the bit being rotated from the
> left towards the right side (or conversely depending on in which bit
> order you internally represent your registers) is fed back to the
> algorithm and mutated depending on given conditions. Hence, the
> 
> shifted-out bit is derived from other processing, and reinserted,
> while being for this reason possibly flipped depending on conditions
> depending on bits present at the other side of the given register.
> 
> This is the explanation for the name of linear feedback shift register
> (shift because of the shift operation required for the rotation, and
> linear feedback because of the constant-time transform operation
> involved).
> 
> The rest of the register may also be mutated at each iteration steps,
> as in the case of the GEA-1 and 2, whole fixed Xor sequences (which
> differ for each register) may be applied depending on whether the
> rotated bit is a 0 or a 1.
> 
> Note that a step where the register iterates is called clocking (the
> register is clocked), and that the fixed points where the register may
> be Xor'ed when the rotated bit becomes a 1 are called taps. The linear
> function which may transmute the rotated bit at the clocking step
> (taking several bits of the original register as an input) is called
> the F function.
> 
> Those kind of bit-oriented LFSR algorithms, such as GEA-1 and 2 (for
> GPRS) and A5/1 and 2 (for GSM), were designed this way for optimal
> hardware implementations in the late 80's and early 90's."
> 
> *****
> 
> IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
> 
> Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
> 
> Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the 
> result.
> 
> Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
> 
> Good for cables ? and noise ?
> 
> Presenting :  IiCE-SSR for digital channel infrastructure & cables
> <Yes Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
> 
> So the question of interleaved Bands & or signal inversion is a simple
> question but we have,
> 
> SSD & HDD Cables & does signal inversion help us? Do interleaving bands help 
> us?
> 
> In Audio inversion would be a strange way to hear! but the inversion
> does help alleviate ...
> 
> Transistor emission fatigue...
> 
> IiCE-SSRTP : Interleaved Inverted Signal Send & Receive Time Crystal Protocol
> 
> Interleaved signals help Isolate noise from a Signal Send & Receive ...
> 
> Overlapping inverted waves are a profile for complex audio & FFT is the 
> result.
> 
> Interleaved, Inverted & Compressed & a simple encryption?
> 
> Good for cables ? and noise ?
> 
> Presenting : IiCE for digital channel infrastructure & cables <Yes
> Even The Internet &+ Ethernet 5 Band>
> 
> (c) Rupert S
> 
> 
> ***** Dukes Of THRUST ******
> 
> Autism, Deafness & the hard of hearing : In need of ANC & Active audio
> clarification or correction 2022-01
> 
> Sony & a few others make noise cancelling headphones that are suitable
> for people with Acute disfunction to brain function for ear drums ...
> Attention deficit or Autism,
> The newer Sony headsets are theoretically enablers of a clear
> confusion free world for Autistic people..
> Reaching out to a larger audience of people simply annoyed by a
> confusing world; While they listen to music..
> Can and does protect a small percentage of people who are confused &
> harassed by major discord located in all jurisdictions of life...
> 
> Crazy noise levels, Or simply drowned in HISSING Static:
> 
> Search for active voice enhanced noise cancellation today.
> 
> Rupert S https://science.n-helix.com 
> 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/11/wave-focus-anc.html 
> 
> https://science.n-helix.com/2021/10/noise-violation-technology-bluetooth.htm 
> l
> 
> 
> https://www.orosound.com/ 
> 
> https://www.consumerreports.org/noise-canceling-headphone/best-noise-canceli 
> ng-headphones-of-the-year-a1166868524/