Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1

> Keep in mind that while the Security BCP explicitly forbids the use of the Password grant in OAuth 2.0, technically OAuth 2.1 just never includes it in the first place. Subtle difference.

As RFC 6749 clearly targets third-party applications, ROPC never has been a good fit.  It always felt like a bad workaround just for legacy applications.

I am primarily looking at OAuth 2.1 from a developer's perspective. Unfortunately, developers often look for a shortcut and the easiest way to implement a required use case.

You can find many entries on StackOverflow directing developers to use ROPC instead of a "complicated" redirection flow.

Frameworks like Spring Security or Angular clearly follow a "secure by default" approach, this may also be a good direction to follow in future specifications.

As Jim already pointed out, I also consider the ROPC being an authentication flow (for trusted first-party applications) and this use case is covered by OIDC.

Same as for PKCE an AS may still provide ROPC in an OAuth 2.0 compatibility mode to not break existing apps.

That is why I support OAuth 2.1 omitting ROPC.

Andreas Falk

________________________________
From: OAuth <oauth-bounces@ietf.org> on behalf of Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
Sent: 12 May 2020 20:19
To: Francis Pouatcha
Cc: OAuth WG
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - recalling ROPC

> We are not talking about ROPC mandating  OAuth2, but about OAuth-2.1 forbidding the user of ROPC.

Keep in mind that while the Security BCP explicitly forbids the use of the Password grant in OAuth 2.0, technically OAuth 2.1 just never includes it in the first place. Subtle difference.

Aaron Parecki

On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 10:23 AM Francis Pouatcha <fpo=40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:

On Tue, May 12, 2020 at 9:50 AM Jim Manico <jim@manicode.com<mailto:jim@manicode.com>> wrote:
Forgive me if this question is late or poor context, but wouldn’t OIDC be a better replacement for ROPC since it’s essentially a authentication flow?

What use case for ROPC mandates OAuth2 over OIDC?
We are not talking about ROPC mandating  OAuth2, but about OAuth-2.1 forbidding the user of ROPC.

--
Jim Manico
@Manicode

On May 11, 2020, at 11:00 PM, Francis Pouatcha <fpo=40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org<mailto:40adorsys.de@dmarc.ietf.org>> wrote:

I am against OAuth 2.1 discarding the use of ROPC (Resource Owner Password Credentials) with the following reasoning:

Auth Code Grant:
There are  many use cases on the market where redirection based flows do not work.. As  we see in the "OAuth 2.1 - require PKCE?" thread, the complexity of user agents on non controllable client devices still make user agent redirection a challenge.

Client Credentials Grant:
Requires the registration of an oAuth client.
- Citing the iot device use cases Beena which do not have a comfortable way to have iot devices register with AS.
- This is a registration flow for the oAuth client role  and for the RO (Resource Owner). Remember resource owner credentials might be sourced from system external to the AS  like company's LDAP. oAuth Client Credentials are generally managed by the AS.
For these reasons, we shall not use Client Credential Grant to manage RO authorization.

ROPC:
Having an oAuth Client proxy the auth request of the RO to the AS only presents a security risk if the oAuth Client is a third party application. Therefore, the decision on whether to accept ROPC for a specified client shall be left to the AS. Discarding this use case will take a lot of business from oAuth servers back to the old market.

Beside this, I mentioned in my previous post that there are use cases in the market where permanent passwords are replaced with one time passwords.

A lot of work is also being done in the direction of having the RO send signed proof of ownership to the AS through the ROPC  flow using the password field.

Therefore, I am ok with raising the attention of  implementers the same way we are doing with PKCE,  mentioning that ROPC  must only be used if  AS / oAuth Client can guarantee security of the RO credentials exposed to the oAuth Client.

/Francis
--
Francis Pouatcha
Co-Founder and Technical Lead at adorys
https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/
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--
Francis Pouatcha
Co-Founder and Technical Lead at adorys
https://adorsys-platform.de/solutions/
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Re: [OAUTH-WG] OAuth 2.1 - recalling ROPC

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