[OAUTH-WG] Signatures spec proposal, take 2

Dirk Balfanz <balfanz@google.com> Thu, 23 September 2010 22:39 UTC

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Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2010 15:39:29 -0700
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From: Dirk Balfanz <balfanz@google.com>
To: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
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Subject: [OAUTH-WG] Signatures spec proposal, take 2
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Hi guys,

sorry it took a while, but here is an updated proposal. It's still in three
parts:

Part I is about "JSON Tokens" that can be used for all sorts of things, not
just OAuth:
http://balfanz.github.com/jsontoken-spec/draft-balfanz-jsontoken-00.html

Part II is about how to embed an OAuth token and (some parts of) an HTTP
request into a JSON Token:
http://balfanz.github.com/jsontoken-spec/draft-balfanz-signedoauth2-00.html

Part III is how to use signatures instead of client secrets for assertions
in OAuth:
http://balfanz.github.com/jsontoken-spec/draft-balfanz-clientassertions-00.html

Diffs from the last specs are:

- JSON Tokens are now just a profile of Magic Signatures, which John Panzer
has helpfully extended for this purpose
- There was a vulnerability to masquerading attacks in the last proposal,
which is addressed in this proposal by adding a data_type parameter that is
part of the signature, but _not_ part of the payload.
- no more support of X.509 certs - the only supported format for discovered
public keys is now the Magic Key format. We'll give people tools (which are
quite easy to write) to convert their self-signed or CA-issued certs to
magic keys.
- The specs are now formatted as I-Ds.

Comments, please!

Dirk.