Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07
Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> Mon, 06 March 2017 06:13 UTC
Return-Path: <samuel@erdtman.se>
X-Original-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: oauth@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id ECEF1129401 for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 22:13:46 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.899
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.899 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=erdtman-se.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id 0p_ZUdjfMKPT for <oauth@ietfa.amsl.com>; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 22:13:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail-ot0-x233.google.com (mail-ot0-x233.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c0f::233]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B40AA127071 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 22:13:44 -0800 (PST)
Received: by mail-ot0-x233.google.com with SMTP id x37so61624012ota.2 for <oauth@ietf.org>; Sun, 05 Mar 2017 22:13:44 -0800 (PST)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=erdtman-se.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=muHKbPjdvlwDKuFw90o2907TN/C+hE3Q6j3V3ysQdjg=; b=nIe4FysxoGdEcffiBbEfThFo17LssamF4Mifm4I/QMhHqu3PgMAojVZ6TRiTxrGWxg DTUsZrjPFYk2bF6Ly7h1wWK59oVtx4o3CPRbfLvHdIuwUoso23ghgTYMhKCkuCaKySWV Feu9gLLsxq8533twxnQea5HG/7pLloUnanLOR1LIP+xIZSi9kARUCpgQMU+f3bHGfMA+ BzEW3FE8xZVVtHLpNfeSwAs0OEwR3UOZq3sXpXk9GC+qRiIBJZtFJQUA27h1jYrzvTeV JqTsg2b59Rd1e7NXyY4gqEBdJ4EQXGyEu/GB7LsH+Fm657ZlPiE++Fhe8+FqhA+IKpsU Hr2Q==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:in-reply-to:references:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=muHKbPjdvlwDKuFw90o2907TN/C+hE3Q6j3V3ysQdjg=; b=NE98uLPXsrJqJvKKOiLbrBfNQ+JPz3Ui+EKM++A2+X9BmTCdPB6fmNCygvfCLuI64v rM5evW76VW/INmJAna2emG8EagNg9NHQ26VVsLku5vf9mEc3ar4Jmryb9VxQr4yVYAzB 31lpfs1eDjtnJMegkB7i1Z0AY8sFJ0mxYhKOYWbes1RCb3Z8jFlwuDHrydInb8oLah6Q c+rgipkdX/oT5i4W346CcmEiVrSHk/CF0uljwFKb5pg2q8Ir/ZF9qizi8Me9i7ofIRF7 iMnMb/i2Mu5BQM5JAREC4rQpF2adCzIXFFdAjZMcc4TZVhk0eKa+We7gESsGkBPdL9uz M0Gw==
X-Gm-Message-State: AMke39lzYQ92VDugPmaph/9mnMA/2GH0AQTm8e8NRSBrJ7QLCQt0BQ3ljLrtwl4q5iJr54s2VBonjlFpodhNKA==
X-Received: by 10.157.43.110 with SMTP id f43mr8152641otd.132.1488780824002; Sun, 05 Mar 2017 22:13:44 -0800 (PST)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Received: by 10.182.125.40 with HTTP; Sun, 5 Mar 2017 22:13:43 -0800 (PST)
In-Reply-To: <CAAP42hCSs2OuA6NaLR98wYTD=z-wCaA-mqOEsEfRWUEg-xwiJQ@mail.gmail.com>
References: <CAF2hCbYL_hi1_kAXhYDcY7vx+iVA0Gf664BN+2jS2OOEGU16eQ@mail.gmail.com> <CAAP42hA5=Pv5avFgaWcnUQqrSjL2oAViybi3V7ixr+yNVFcj_g@mail.gmail.com> <304c520f-e531-2ac8-f93f-b91aae11253c@free.fr> <CAAP42hAV+-AGemqUEU1yNcM70Zt9xF7m=u_Bnm_T82Ph1Wzu3A@mail.gmail.com> <DC50BBDC-ECC3-4883-93A1-B7A73F0C25ED@mit.edu> <CAF2hCbbL1td2jPtUO6hbuKXQ2b8S6v3E0ymOwqnL4zv=sAqSGw@mail.gmail.com> <CAAP42hCSs2OuA6NaLR98wYTD=z-wCaA-mqOEsEfRWUEg-xwiJQ@mail.gmail.com>
From: Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2017 07:13:43 +0100
Message-ID: <CAF2hCbbZZcz87Z+Sn7S8L7S_5KgZAq1pkSfE8kojdAiZ_diNuw@mail.gmail.com>
To: William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="001a11c162bc29d647054a09cca5"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/oauth/AKrt4Ld3uATG5RRftKF6yzL1wBw>
Cc: "<oauth@ietf.org>" <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07
X-BeenThere: oauth@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.17
Precedence: list
List-Id: OAUTH WG <oauth.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/oauth/>
List-Post: <mailto:oauth@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth>, <mailto:oauth-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 06 Mar 2017 06:13:47 -0000
Thanks Denis! On Fri, Mar 3, 2017 at 7:37 AM, William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com> wrote: > Thanks all for the great discussion. I tweaked the discussion on > public/confidential clients to rely more on the OAuth2 definition (it was a > bit duplicative), and I reordered the security considerations so it flows > better, but have kept the normative language for now. Let's see how it pans > out during the finalization process. > > On Mon, Feb 27, 2017 at 8:47 AM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> wrote: > >> Thanks for the replies. >> >> If there are no formal guidelines from IETF I think we should just >> proceed it is a good and informative spec, it was just to me it felt >> slightly of. >> >> Based on the conversation I have no objections taking this draft to RFC. >> >> //Samuel >> >> On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 12:09 AM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: >> >>> When I brought RFCs 7591, 7592, and 7662 up through the finalization >>> process, I learned that there are two camps out there on normative >>> requirements in the security considerations section. Some like them, as >>> long as they don’t contradict requirements/advice in previous sections, and >>> some don’t like them, preferring all normative material be in the “body” of >>> the spec itself. I was given the impression that it was more of a stylistic >>> choice than anything, but I can only speak from my personal experience. >>> >>> — Justin >>> >>> On Feb 21, 2017, at 3:17 PM, William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> The only real requirement in that section I guess is the use of PKCE >>> (8.2). That requirement could be moved to the body of the doc, while >>> keeping the longer discussing around code interception in the security >>> considerations. To me the remaining text are indeed security best >>> practices / clarifications. >>> >>> Other OAuth WG RFCs have requirement level capitalization in the >>> Security Section like RFC7591. I always assumed these were best-practice >>> security requirements. But if the style is really not to do this, the >>> requirement level capitalization could be dropped from that section in the >>> native apps BCP. >>> >>> On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 12:50 AM, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> I *don't thin**k* it's normal to have normative text in the Security >>>> Considerations, hence I support Samuel's position. >>>> >>>> Let us look at the first MUST from RFC 6749 in the Security >>>> Considerations section: >>>> >>>> The authorization server *MUST *authenticate the client *whenever possible*. >>>> This sentence is incorrect. The right sentence should be : >>>> >>>> The authorization server *should *authenticate the client whenever possible. >>>> >>>> RFC 6749 is not an example to follow. >>>> >>>> Denis >>>> >>>> >>>> I do think it's normal to have normative text in the Security >>>> Considerations. RFC6749 has a lengthy Security Considerations section >>>> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10> with a lot of >>>> normative text. >>>> >>>> Think of it this way: Sections 4 to 7 describe how to use native app >>>> URI schemes to perform OAuth flows from the app to browser and back. If you >>>> only read those sections, you could have a functioning (but potentially >>>> insecure) OAuth flow in a native app. The security section adds some >>>> security requirements and clarifications for implementing Sections 4-7, >>>> like using PKCE, and more. >>>> >>>> Reviewing sub-section by sub-section: >>>> >>>> 8.1 Definitely belongs here, as the the whole BCP is about native-app >>>> URI schemes, whereas doing OAuth in a WebView doesn't need those (as the >>>> client can just pluck out the code from any redirect URI) >>>> 8.2 Requires that servers who want to follow the native apps BCP >>>> support PKCE, and recommends that they reject requests from clients who >>>> don't. This *could* be in the main doc, but since PKCE is an existing >>>> thing, and is purely additive from a security perspective, I think this >>>> reference works fine. Originally I talked about PKCE more in the doc body, >>>> but some reviewers thought it was then a little duplicative of the PKCE doc >>>> itself. >>>> 8.3 This reads like classic security considerations to me, clarifying >>>> some details of 7.3 >>>> 8.4 Part of this reads a little new-ish, regarding distinguishing >>>> native clients from web ones. But on review, I think could just be >>>> re-worded to reference RFC6749 Section 2.1. >>>> 8.5 This one belongs where it is since the body of the BCP is talking >>>> about the code flow. >>>> 8.6 Totally belongs. >>>> 8.7 to 8.11 belong IMO, they are security clarifications of >>>> long-standing topics. >>>> >>>> My methodology when reviewing this was: is the text introducing a new >>>> topic directly related to native apps or sections 4-7, or does it discuss >>>> an old security topic in the context of native apps, or add security >>>> related discussions of the content in 4-7. Of all those, I really only see >>>> a bit of new topic related to native apps in 8.4, and in actual fact it >>>> that sub-section should probably be reworded since RFC6749 already >>>> establishes the public client type, which native apps are and a reference >>>> would be more appropriate (which would reduce it to just clarifying an old >>>> topic). >>>> >>>> What do you think of this analysis? Do you have any specific sections >>>> or text you feel are better suited in the document body? I will take an >>>> action item to revise section 8.4. >>>> >>>> On Mon, Feb 20, 2017 at 9:57 PM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>>> Hi, >>>>> >>>>> I just had a question on best practice. In this document a large part >>>>> of the normative text is located under Security Considerations. >>>>> >>>>> I had previously seen Security Considerations as things to think about >>>>> when implementing not so much as MUSTs and MUST NOTs. >>>>> >>>>> I think it is okay to have it this way but it surprised me a bit and >>>>> wanted to ask if there is any best practice for the Security Considerations >>>>> section saying what type of information it should include. >>>>> >>>>> Best Regards >>>>> Samuel Erdtman >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> _______________________________________________ >>>> OAuth mailing list >>>> OAuth@ietf.org >>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>>> >>>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> OAuth mailing list >>> OAuth@ietf.org >>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >>> >>> >> >
- [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07 Samuel Erdtman
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Samuel Erdtman
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Samuel Erdtman