Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07
Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> Mon, 27 February 2017 16:47 UTC
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From: Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2017 17:47:49 +0100
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To: Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07
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Thanks for the replies. If there are no formal guidelines from IETF I think we should just proceed it is a good and informative spec, it was just to me it felt slightly of. Based on the conversation I have no objections taking this draft to RFC. //Samuel On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 12:09 AM, Justin Richer <jricher@mit.edu> wrote: > When I brought RFCs 7591, 7592, and 7662 up through the finalization > process, I learned that there are two camps out there on normative > requirements in the security considerations section. Some like them, as > long as they don’t contradict requirements/advice in previous sections, and > some don’t like them, preferring all normative material be in the “body” of > the spec itself. I was given the impression that it was more of a stylistic > choice than anything, but I can only speak from my personal experience. > > — Justin > > On Feb 21, 2017, at 3:17 PM, William Denniss <wdenniss@google.com> wrote: > > The only real requirement in that section I guess is the use of PKCE > (8.2). That requirement could be moved to the body of the doc, while > keeping the longer discussing around code interception in the security > considerations. To me the remaining text are indeed security best > practices / clarifications. > > Other OAuth WG RFCs have requirement level capitalization in the Security > Section like RFC7591. I always assumed these were best-practice security > requirements. But if the style is really not to do this, the requirement > level capitalization could be dropped from that section in the native apps > BCP. > > On Tue, Feb 21, 2017 at 12:50 AM, Denis <denis.ietf@free.fr> wrote: > >> >> I *don't thin**k* it's normal to have normative text in the Security >> Considerations, hence I support Samuel's position. >> >> Let us look at the first MUST from RFC 6749 in the Security >> Considerations section: >> >> The authorization server *MUST *authenticate the client *whenever possible*. >> This sentence is incorrect. The right sentence should be : >> >> The authorization server *should *authenticate the client whenever possible. >> >> RFC 6749 is not an example to follow. >> >> Denis >> >> >> I do think it's normal to have normative text in the Security >> Considerations. RFC6749 has a lengthy Security Considerations section >> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10> with a lot of normative >> text. >> >> Think of it this way: Sections 4 to 7 describe how to use native app URI >> schemes to perform OAuth flows from the app to browser and back. If you >> only read those sections, you could have a functioning (but potentially >> insecure) OAuth flow in a native app. The security section adds some >> security requirements and clarifications for implementing Sections 4-7, >> like using PKCE, and more. >> >> Reviewing sub-section by sub-section: >> >> 8.1 Definitely belongs here, as the the whole BCP is about native-app URI >> schemes, whereas doing OAuth in a WebView doesn't need those (as the client >> can just pluck out the code from any redirect URI) >> 8.2 Requires that servers who want to follow the native apps BCP support >> PKCE, and recommends that they reject requests from clients who don't. >> This *could* be in the main doc, but since PKCE is an existing thing, and >> is purely additive from a security perspective, I think this reference >> works fine. Originally I talked about PKCE more in the doc body, but some >> reviewers thought it was then a little duplicative of the PKCE doc itself. >> 8.3 This reads like classic security considerations to me, clarifying >> some details of 7.3 >> 8.4 Part of this reads a little new-ish, regarding distinguishing native >> clients from web ones. But on review, I think could just be re-worded to >> reference RFC6749 Section 2.1. >> 8.5 This one belongs where it is since the body of the BCP is talking >> about the code flow. >> 8.6 Totally belongs. >> 8.7 to 8.11 belong IMO, they are security clarifications of long-standing >> topics. >> >> My methodology when reviewing this was: is the text introducing a new >> topic directly related to native apps or sections 4-7, or does it discuss >> an old security topic in the context of native apps, or add security >> related discussions of the content in 4-7. Of all those, I really only see >> a bit of new topic related to native apps in 8.4, and in actual fact it >> that sub-section should probably be reworded since RFC6749 already >> establishes the public client type, which native apps are and a reference >> would be more appropriate (which would reduce it to just clarifying an old >> topic). >> >> What do you think of this analysis? Do you have any specific sections or >> text you feel are better suited in the document body? I will take an >> action item to revise section 8.4. >> >> On Mon, Feb 20, 2017 at 9:57 PM, Samuel Erdtman <samuel@erdtman.se> >> wrote: >> >>> Hi, >>> >>> I just had a question on best practice. In this document a large part of >>> the normative text is located under Security Considerations. >>> >>> I had previously seen Security Considerations as things to think about >>> when implementing not so much as MUSTs and MUST NOTs. >>> >>> I think it is okay to have it this way but it surprised me a bit and >>> wanted to ask if there is any best practice for the Security Considerations >>> section saying what type of information it should include. >>> >>> Best Regards >>> Samuel Erdtman >>> >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing listOAuth@ietf.orghttps://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> >> >> _______________________________________________ >> OAuth mailing list >> OAuth@ietf.org >> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth >> >> > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > > > > _______________________________________________ > OAuth mailing list > OAuth@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/oauth > >
- [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-apps-07 Samuel Erdtman
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Denis
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Justin Richer
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Samuel Erdtman
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… William Denniss
- Re: [OAUTH-WG] review draft-ietf-oauth-native-app… Samuel Erdtman