Re: [OAUTH-WG] Hashing passwords for "password" grant type

Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp> Fri, 10 September 2010 14:55 UTC

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Date: Fri, 10 Sep 2010 23:55:17 +0900
From: Yutaka OIWA <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>
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To: Aaron Parecki <aaron@parecki.com>
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Hashing passwords for "password" grant type
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Hi Aaron,

In usual security senses, just hashing or salting the on-wire passwords will not
improve security against credential stealing (both on-wire and local), because
stolen hashed password will allow accesses to the resources.

# At least theoretically, we can say that it "weakens" the security, because
# stealing hashed passwords is theoretically "easier" than stealing raw
# passwords (hint: the latter implies the former).

If you are really concerning server-side leakage of on-wire credentials,
one way is to request Digest- or APOP-style challenge-responses
(but it may need one additional round-trip messages for getting a challenge,
 depending on the setting.)

# One setting on which hashing the password makes security sense is
# to use hashed passwords for low-security low-privilege interfaces
# (e.g. tweeting) and to require raw passwords for
# high-security high-privilege interfaces (such as configuration changes.)

On 2010/09/07 12:09, Aaron Parecki wrote:
> Hi folks,
> 
> I'm implementing OAuth 2 for my project (geoloqi.com <http://geoloqi.com>) where
> I have some mobile phone clients needing to authenticate. I'm using the
> "password" grant type for these clients. Even though the call to the token
> endpoint is going over HTTPS, I'm still slightly concerned about sending the
> user's password to the server unencrypted. (I don't want the users' passwords to
> appear in my debug log file for instance.) Does the spec allow for or have a way
> to extend so that I can define a hashing algorithm the client can use to encrypt
> the password before sending it? I'm already not storing the passwords in plain
> text in the database anyway. Anybody else dealing with a similar issue?
> 
> Aaron
> 
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> OAuth mailing list
> OAuth@ietf.org
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-- 
大岩 寛   Yutaka Oiwa                       独立行政法人 産業技術総合研究所
            情報セキュリティ研究センター ソフトウェアセキュリティ研究チーム
                                      <y.oiwa@aist.go.jp>, <yutaka@oiwa.jp>
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