Re: [OAUTH-WG] Indicating sites where a token is valid

Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net> Fri, 07 May 2010 06:08 UTC

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From: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
To: Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net>
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Date: Fri, 07 May 2010 08:06:03 +0200
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Cc: OAuth WG <oauth@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Indicating sites where a token is valid
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Additionally, I would propose to indicate the scope associated with a  
token to the client using a scope response parameter. This is  
especially useful (1) if the client did not pass a scope parameter but  
the server decided to associate a scope based on its policy or (2) if  
the user decided to authorize a subset of the requested scope only.

Regards,
Torsten.



Am 07.05.2010 um 07:32 schrieb Torsten Lodderstedt <torsten@lodderstedt.net 
 >:

> what about an additional realm response value?
>
> If there is a binding between realm and token, the client can decide  
> based on the realm attribute discovered using a WWW-Authenticate  
> response which token to use.
>
> regards,
> Torsten.
>
> Am 07.05.2010 07:06, schrieb Manger, James H:
>>
>> Every existing use of Cookies, HTTP Basic, and HTTP Digest relies  
>> on clients being told by the server about the sites at which the  
>> secret (cookie/password/token) can be used (and, more importantly,  
>> where is must not be used). This occurs without requiring service- 
>> specific knowledge in the client app. OAuth aims to replace some of  
>> these uses.
>>
>> HTTP Basic authentication works safely from clients with no service- 
>> specific knowledge because the client knows not to send the  
>> password it gets from the user to other sites.
>>
>> HTTP Digest authentication allows a password to used to across a  
>> set of domains specified in a WWW-Authenticate response header, but  
>> the password will not be used at arbitrary other sites.
>>
>> Cookies are sent in requests to the same site, sites with the same  
>> parent, or only https sites, depending on details from the service  
>> when setting the cookie.
>>
>>
>> To date, OAuth has assumed every client app has lots of service- 
>> specific knowledge to make these choices. OAuth needs to remove the  
>> need for so much service-specific knowledge to be as interoperable  
>> as other standard auth mechanism, otherwise it is a poor replacement.
>>
>> --
>> James Manger
>>
>> From: David Recordon [mailto:recordond@gmail.com]
>> Sent: Friday, 7 May 2010 2:05 PM
>> To: Manger, James H
>> Cc: OAuth WG
>> Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Indicating sites where a token is valid
>>
>> Hey James,
>> Do you have a specific example in mind where this either has been  
>> an issue or will be an issue? Most client implementations I've seen  
>> of OAuth (and technologies like OAuth) have a strong binding  
>> between the access token(s), site they were issued by, and user  
>> they belong to. So I haven't heard of this being a problem in the  
>> wild...
>>
>> --David
>>
>>
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