Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mail regarding draft-ietf-oauth-mtls

Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com> Tue, 06 November 2018 01:56 UTC

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From: Brian Campbell <bcampbell@pingidentity.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Nov 2018 08:55:34 +0700
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To: Evan Gilman <evan2645@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [OAUTH-WG] Mail regarding draft-ietf-oauth-mtls
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Thanks Evan for bringing this to the WG's attention. More or less the same
question/issue was raised yesterday in the area director's review of the
document as well. I plan to bring this up as a discussion item in the
meeting today. But my sense from some early discussions is that there is
likely to be (rough) consensus to make some change in order to allow a SAN
to be specified as the certificate subject identifier in the PKI client
auth mode. We'll need to figure out the specifics of how that works. I
don't think there are significant drawbacks to extending the number of
client registration metadata parameters per se. I guess I've just been
attracted to the idea of overloading the existing value because that felt
like maybe a less invasive change. But perhaps that's shortsighted. And
there's nothing inherently wrong with additional client metadata
parameters.

I don't know if we could get away with a single new parameter that could
carry the value for any SAN type. Something like, { ...
"tls_client_auth_san": "spiffe://trust-domain/path" ...}. In practice I
feel like that'd probably be okay but in theory there's the potential for
confusion of the value across different types. So probably there's a need
to indicate the SAN type too. Either with more client metadata parameters
like tls_client_auth_san_uir, tls_client_auth_san_email,
tls_client_auth_san_ip, etc. or maybe with a structured value of some sort
like {... "tls_client_auth_san": {"type":"URI",
"value":"spiffe://trust-domain/path"} ... }. And then deciding which types
to support and if/how to allow for the extensible types.

Anyway, those are just some thoughts on it. And it'll be discussed more
today. Suggested/proposed text is always helpful though (even if it's not
used directly it can help move the conversation forward and/or help
editor(s) to have prospective wording).





On Tue, Nov 6, 2018 at 5:53 AM Evan Gilman <evan2645@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello everyone.
>
> Very excited to see this draft. It helps tremendously in addressing
> use cases around oauth client management in machine-to-machine
> scenarios. Particularly, the PKI authentication method.
>
> In reviewing the document, I noticed that the only supported method
> for identifying a client using the PKI authentication method is by
> referencing its distinguished name. This caught me a bit by surprise -
> many newer projects aimed at automating X.509 issuance in the
> datacenter utilize SAN extensions rather than distinguished name in
> order to encode identity. I am further under the impression that the
> community is, in general, moving away from the subject extension
> altogether in favor of SAN-based identification.
>
> Full disclosure: I am one of the maintainers on a project called
> SPIFFE, which provides identity specifications for datacenter workload
> applications. For X.509, SPIFFE encodes identity into a URI SAN
> extension. A number of projects using SPIFFE do not configure the
> subject with identifying information (SPIRE and Google Istio being
> just a couple). I am also hearing of other X.509 automation projects
> which are moving away from subject/distinguished name (even if they
> are not using SPIFFE).
>
> While I think support for distinguished name is absolutely necessary,
> I worry that supporting it solely will render it incompatible with
> some of the more modern PKIX systems and not stand the test of time. I
> know that I am a little late to this, and for that I apologize... but
> I feel this is a significant point.
>
> I would like to open a discussion on supporting the most commonly used
> SAN extension types in addition to distinguished name. To accomplish
> this, amending section 2.1.2 `Client Registration Metadata` with
> additional parameters seems appropriate. In my experience, the most
> commonly used SAN extensions are: DNS name, IP address, URI, and email
> address.
>
> Are there significant drawbacks to extending the number of client
> registration metadata parameters? I would very much like to see this -
> without it, many existing projects will be unable to use the spec. I
> am happy to contribute time and text to this, assuming people feel
> that this is a beneficial addition. Sorry again for the timing
>
> --
> evan
>
> _______________________________________________
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>

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