Re: [openpgp] RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP for v5

Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> Sun, 28 February 2021 18:45 UTC

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From: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
To: "brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Cc: openpgp@ietf.org
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Date: Sun, 28 Feb 2021 19:43:19 +0100
In-Reply-To: <YDrbaRiQ34MstP30@camp.crustytoothpaste.net> (brian m. carlson's message of "Sat, 27 Feb 2021 23:53:13 +0000")
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] RSA-PSS and RSA-OAEP for v5
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On Sat, 27 Feb 2021 23:53, brian m. carlson said:

> I'm interested in seeing if we can require v5 SKESK packets with RSA use
> RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 and MGF1-SHA-256 and require that v5 signatures

That would add a lot of additional complexity for no good reason because
RSA will over short or long anyway be replaces by 25519 and 448.

> I realize this requires implementers to add additional code, but I think
> the increase in security is worth it given the number of CVEs we've seen
> for padding vulnerabilities.  We can tell implementers to avoid this

and replace them with bugs in the way more complext PSS and OAEP.

I see no reason for it and doubt that this can be viewed as part of the
WG's old and new charter.


Shalom-Salam,

   Werner

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