Re: [openpgp] Expected client behaviour ambiguity in signature verification

[Daniel Huigens <[e-mail]>]

On Friday, July 8th, 2022 at 15:14, Justus Winter wrote:

> You said before that you prefer not to use the reordering heuristic.
> But how else should the keyserver fix the certificate?

I meant more that they could do a manual intervention for the keys where
that happened, perhaps. (Particularly in the case where the keyserver
itself broke the key, I didn't mean that they should fix up these keys
in general.) Then, they could also verify the signature packets with
each of the components, to check where it should be placed.

Obviously if we remove the hash prefix in v5, and the bug happens again
with v5 keys, and there are some third-party signatures that they can't
verify, then that won't be possible.

However, I don't think that's a very strong argument for keeping the
hash prefix: keyservers could do any number of things to corrupt or
break public keys, most of which are not recoverable. So I don't think
we should necessarily design around that possibility.

Best,
Daniel