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Re: [openpgp] Expected client behaviour ambiguity in signature verification

Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li> Fri, 08 July 2022 10:58 UTC

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Date: Fri, 08 Jul 2022 11:57:59 +0100
From: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>
To: openpgp@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Expected client behaviour ambiguity in signature verification
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On Fri, Jul 08, 2022 at 12:53:39PM +0200, Justus Winter wrote:
> Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li> writes:
> > I ended up dropping the check from onak as a result
> Alternatively, keyservers (anyone, really) could fix the digest prefix.

I did consider this option, but it was before onak gained the ability to
do the cryptographic signature verification.

We still don't seem to know what's *generating* the bad data.

J.

-- 
Revd Jonathan McDowell, ULC | I program, therefore I am.

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