Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints and their collisions resistance

[Andrey Jivsov <[e-mail]>]

On 01/03/2013 02:54 PM, Werner Koch wrote:
> On Thu,  3 Jan 2013 20:06, [e-mail] said:
>
> ...
>> Let's say we choose SHA-3-384, which is no more difficult to implement
>> than SHA-2. We then simply use the current fingerprint algorithm but
> Except that SHA-2 is already in use and has hardware support.
... but there is no reason why SHA-3 will not optimized in the future. 
BTW, which SHA-2 friendly CPU feature we are talking about? ( other than 
Intel's plans to add cycle shift )

In any case, please note that we are talking about hashing the key 
material and thus the performance of the hash algorithm doesn't matter.

My preference for SHA-3 is to satisfy the concerns of algorithm agility. 
I argue for a hardcoded algorithm, and thus the natural choice is the 
strongest of SHA that will be future-proof for regulatory compliance.

I would also be OK to do SHA-2 + SHA-3, TLS style, to be future proof, 
but this seems too paranoid.

>> instead of SHA-1 use SHA-3-384. Then allow truncation of the output
>> (it's already implied by the 8 byte keyIDs). 20 byte fingerprint on a
>> business card may be reasonable, but we also would like to have full
> So why should we truncate the fingerprint?  Is there a reason to believe
> that truncation to 160 bit of SHA-2 or SHA-3 is seriously more secure
> than SHA-1?  I don't know.

The current attacks tell us so. Instead of 80 bit is security (birthday 
bounds) SHA-1 is listed as 51 bits on 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Message_digest. The number can continue to 
go lower.

But I also think that it makes sense to standardise on larger than 160 
bits of the fingerprint as a UI feature (somewhere between 160 and 384 
bits).

>
>> strength for regulatory compliance. Consider not hashing the key
>> creation date. Fixing all the variables in this paragraph, we have the
> What would be the advantage of this except for yet another code path.
>
>> signed message, but I don't think they materially care about the
>> flavour of the fingerprint (as long as it's a "strong" one).
> They will care if a key suddenly comes with two different fingerprints.
> We never had this situation in OpenPGP.  Recall how long it took to get
> rid of v3 keys.  Thus if we want a new fingerprint algorithm we need to
> change more than just this.

While every key inherently will have two fingerprints -- old and new 
(and I was saying don't make it worse with hash variations) -- the 
software should probably select to display only one of them with an 
option to change it.

We might let users enter the fingerprint as before but then use it for 
dual purpose as SHA-1 or new one (as opposed to using an explicit type). 
At some point in the future one might start flagging links achieved with 
the old fingerprint. Features flags will be helpful for this (i.e. I 
generate a key that I want to be known only by its new fingerprint; I 
put this fact into Features; don't match this key by the old fingerprint)

>
> BTW, what about re-establishing the OpenPGP WG?

I suppose it's a matter of how much work there is in the OpenPGP.