Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints and their collisions resistance

Andrey Jivsov <openpgp@brainhub.org> Sun, 06 January 2013 06:28 UTC

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Date: Sat, 05 Jan 2013 22:28:43 -0800
From: Andrey Jivsov <openpgp@brainhub.org>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] Fingerprints and their collisions resistance
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On 01/05/2013 07:19 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
>
> On Jan 5, 2013, at 3:22 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:
>
>> iirc, there was a rough consensus within this working group that this
>> was probably a mistake in RFC 4880, and any future revision of the draft
>> should place the full key material into the revocation key subpacket
>> instead of the key's fingerprint.
>
> I was about to comment that if we move on shifting to ECC keys as per Andrey's work on them, we could just about eliminate fingerprints and just use the keys.
>
> Also, the point compression patent expired last year.
>
> 	Jon

BTW, here is my current contribution to the process of making OpenPGP 
data structures most compact: 
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-jivsov-ecc-compact-00 . It's a generic 
format that can be used anywhere: X.509, DNS, etc. Realistically, I hope 
that designers of new protocols at IETF will consider this (more 
superior to SEC1 :-)) proposal...

Back to OpenPGP, there is certainly a need to have most compact keys and 
messages, and this is one of the advantages of the ECC keys. It's 
remarkable that one can have a 32 byte public key of AES-128 strength 
and my proposal lays the groundwork to make this happen in OpenPGP (v.s. 
the current 65 bytes).

Given that OpenPGP messages are very compact by design, everything fits 
nicely together.