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Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids.

ianG <iang@iang.org> Mon, 10 August 2015 03:02 UTC

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Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 04:03:10 +0100
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] SHA3 algorithm ids.
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On 8/08/2015 23:48 pm, ianG wrote:

> http://www.metzdowd.com/pipermail/cryptography/2015-August/026238.html

> From: Krisztián Pintér <pinterkr@gmail.com>
...

> so to save the day, they added the SHAKE instances as a workaround.
> they are pretty much what SHA3 should have been. if you don't
> understand how a sponge works, you are very much free to use the SHA3
> instances. but if you want to do actual cryptography, you should
> choose the SHAKE's.


Which I think can be interpreted as suggestion to use SHAKE256, instead 
of the SHA3-xxx.

A potential advantage of that is that the algorithm expands, so we don't 
need to specify truncation any more.

Just call it with a range of set params for 'd':

keyId:         32
fingerprint:   100, 150
hash:          256.

(by way of example) Is there any known advantage of the smaller lengths 
being subsets of the larger?

iang

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