Re: [openpgp] email death certificates
David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> Sun, 25 August 2019 03:53 UTC
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From: David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com>
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Date: Sat, 24 Aug 2019 23:53:03 -0400
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To: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] email death certificates
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On Aug 23, 2019, at 8:03 PM, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote: > > > David Shaw <dshaw@jabberwocky.com> wrote: >>> Has anyone given any thought to this? >>> >>> I suppose it might also apply to "does not work here anymore" > >> There is a "Reason for Revocation" subpacket for the revocation >> signature. It contains both a machine-readable byte giving various >> reasons for revocation (key superseded, compromised, or retired, user >> ID no longer valid, or a general "other"), followed by a human-readable >> string. > >> I suppose a death notification would be "key retired", with additional >> information (if any) given in the human-readable string. This works >> with the designated revoker feature as well as the regular (self) >> revocation, so even if the private key is missing (or, being dead, the >> owner is unable to enter a passphrase) the key can still be revoked. > > The designated revoker is singular. > > There is no k-of-n (or rather K) threshold the way that signature on UIDs > works. If there was N signatures binding me@example.com to key 0x12345678, > then it would be nice if the self-sign on the key could set a value k, > which if at least K entities revoke their signature (not just expire) with > an identical reason, would signal that the key<->UID is no longer valid. Designated revoker is not quite singular. You can have more than one designated revoker on a given key - it is true, though, that any single one of them can revoke the key. I'd be somewhat afraid to use a scheme where people not chosen by me could "gang up" and cause a UID to be revoked. Or for that matter, a single angry person could make N keys, sign the UID and then revoke that signature with each of those N keys. Designated revoker lets me, as the key owner, pick who is allowed to kill my key. David
- [openpgp] email death certificates Michael Richardson
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Derek Atkins
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates David Shaw
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Stephen Farrell
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Michael Richardson
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Peter Gutmann
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates David Shaw
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Heiko Stamer
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Jon Callas
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Michael Richardson
- Re: [openpgp] email death certificates Jon Callas