Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requirement
"Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org> Sat, 03 December 2022 14:49 UTC
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Date: Sat, 03 Dec 2022 15:49:08 +0100
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From: "Neal H. Walfield" <neal@walfield.org>
To: Aron Wussler <aron@wussler.it>
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Subject: Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requirement
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On Fri, 02 Dec 2022 23:38:05 +0100, Aron Wussler wrote: > > if a subkey binding signature includes the Key Flags subpacket and > > the certification capability (0x1) or the signing capability (0x2) > > is set, then the subkey binding signature must also contain a valid > > primary key binding signature issued by the subkey over the primary > > key. > > I agree with this. > > As a side note, I don't know whether we should allow subkeys to issue certifications. > > In real life I found poor support for subkeys with certification capability. I found no real way to create such keys (without messing with them manually) and other implementations didn't understand certifications made from that key. > > Maybe we should either forbid that entirely or explicitly support it. I agree that support for certification-capable subkeys is quite poor. And, I think that is quite unfortunate. A certification-capable subkey can be particularly helpful when using an offline primary key: even though the primary key is offline, it is still possible to create third-party signatures online. This is a major pain point for me. When I want to certify a certificate, I need to boot up my offline computer, transfer the certificate, certify it, and then transfer it back. Having a certification-capable subkey would reduce that friction. I'm also aware of a company that does centralized key management, and doesn't give users access to their primary key. This means that users are not able to directly create third-party certifications. Instead they have to use a web portal. That, of course, integrates horribly with other tooling. Certification-capable subkeys would also help here. Anyway, I believe this discussion is out of scope for the crypto refresh. Neal
- [openpgp] primary key binding signature requireme… Neal H. Walfield
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Aron Wussler
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Paul Schaub
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Neal H. Walfield
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Neal H. Walfield
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Aron Wussler
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Neal H. Walfield
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Aron Wussler
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Neal H. Walfield
- Re: [openpgp] primary key binding signature requi… Aron Wussler