[openpgp] [[e-mail]] New Version Notification for draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-04.txt

[Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[e-mail]>]

Hi all--

I've just released version -04 of the OpenPGP Abuse-Resistant Keystores
draft.

substantive changes bewteen -03 and -04:

 * change "certificate update" to "certificate refresh" for clarity
 * relax first-party-attested third-party certification constraints
   at the suggestion of Valodim
 * introduce "primary key sovereignty" concept explicitly
 * describe how to distribute and consume attestation revocations
 * introduce augmentation to TPK for third-party certification revocation
   distribution

Please take a look!

       --dkg

--- Begin Message ---

A new version of I-D, draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-04.txt
has been successfully submitted by Daniel Kahn Gillmor and posted to the
IETF repository.

Name:		draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore
Revision:	04
Title:		Abuse-Resistant OpenPGP Keystores
Document date:	2019-08-22
Group:		Individual Submission
Pages:		58
URL:            https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-04.txt
Status:         https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore/
Htmlized:       https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-04
Htmlized:       https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore
Diff:           https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-dkg-openpgp-abuse-resistant-keystore-04

Abstract:
   OpenPGP transferable public keys are composite certificates, made up
   of primary keys, direct key signatures, user IDs, identity
   certifications ("signature packets"), subkeys, and so on.  They are
   often assembled by merging multiple certificates that all share the
   same primary key, and are distributed in public keystores.

   Unfortunately, since many keystores permit any third-party to add a
   certification with any content to any OpenPGP certificate, the
   assembled/merged form of a certificate can become unwieldy or
   undistributable.  Furthermore, keystores that are searched by user ID
   or fingerprint can be made unusable for specific searches by public
   submission of bogus certificates.  And finally, keystores open to
   public submission can also face simple resource exhaustion from
   flooding with bogus submissions, or legal or other risks from uploads
   of toxic data.

   This draft documents techniques that an archive of OpenPGP
   certificates can use to mitigate the impact of these various attacks,
   and the implications of these concerns and mitigations for the rest
   of the OpenPGP ecosystem.

                                                                                  


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