Re: [OPSAWG] Christian's review of draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-22

Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com> Mon, 26 February 2018 19:02 UTC

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From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2018 14:02:08 -0500
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To: Joe Touch <touch@strayalpha.com>
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Subject: Re: [OPSAWG] Christian's review of draft-mm-wg-effect-encrypt-22
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On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Joe Touch <touch@strayalpha.com> wrote:

>
>
> On Feb 25, 2018, at 8:51 PM, Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists@gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
> I am very skeptical of the justification for performance enhancing
>> proxies in section 2.2.4. It develops the idea that having a form of
>>
>
> These are primarily 'satellite games' proxies.. that early-ack and such to
> make the long satellite portion of the transport seem short(er).
> They only REALLY need to see TCP headers, so ipsec is problematic, but not
> (probably) tls.
>
>
> Enabling TCP Hijacking should never be justification for “needing” to
> avoid transport header privacy, IMO.
>
> Games or other apps that “need” such support ought to “need” to explicitly
> permit it by peering their security with those proxies directly.
>


apologies: "games" in my reply could better be called: "shennanigans" ...
not games like farmville, but messy things the satellite ( in the past
anyway) providers would do to make tcp appear to perform better in their
environment.

Yes, people COULD ipsec around that problem.
Yes, people COULD md5-tcp around that problem. (tcp-ao, ha!)

generally none of that has happened though.