Re: [OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-opsawg-coman-use-cases-04: (with DISCUSS)

"Sehgal, Anuj" <s.anuj@jacobs-university.de> Tue, 24 February 2015 13:51 UTC

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From: "Sehgal, Anuj" <s.anuj@jacobs-university.de>
To: ext Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-opsawg-coman-use-cases-04: (with DISCUSS)
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Subject: Re: [OPSAWG] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-opsawg-coman-use-cases-04: (with DISCUSS)
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Hi,

The following inline comments are an overview of the actions taken
to resolve the issues raised by Kathleen and Ted.

> On 19 Feb 2015, at 4:43 pm, ext Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thanks for your work on this draft, I just have some security stuff I'd
> like to discuss that should be easy to resolve as some text is provided.
> 
> In section 4.5, it is critical to also include a statement on security in
> addition to privacy.  Medical devices with network attachments could be
> used to kill someone.
> http://abcnews.go.com/Health/dick-cheneys-fear-heart-device-hacks-justified-experts/story?id=20633284
> 
> Suggest changing this text from:
>   In both cases, however,
>   it is crucial to protect the privacy of the people to which medical
>   devices are attached.  Even though the data collected by a heart beat
>   monitor might be protected, the pure fact that someone carries such a
>   device may need protection.  As such, certain medical appliances may
>   not want to participate in discovery and self-configuration protocols
>   in order to remain invisible.
> To:
>   In both cases, however,
>   it is crucial to protect the safety and privacy of the people to which
> medical
>   devices are attached.  Security precautions to protect access
> (authentication, encryption, integrity protections, etc.) to such devices
> may be critical to protecting the safety of the individual. Even though
> the data collected by a heart beat
>   monitor might be protected, the pure fact that someone carries such a
>   device may need protection.  As such, certain medical appliances may
>   not want to participate in discovery and self-configuration protocols
>   in order to remain invisible.

Adopted text in Section 4.5 - Medical Applications.

> General statement:
> Many of the other use case scenarios also have safety as a concern,
> requiring security protections (Confidentiality, Integrity,
> Availability).  Sensors used to control environmental settings is another
> example where air regulation might include detection of harmful things in
> the air (carbon monoxide).  I'm sure there are other safety concerns that
> motivate security protections in each of the use cases, it's not just
> privacy (which is important).  What if a sensor was tampered with to
> report or not report something detected?  That's not covered in the
> discussion on availability related problems in 4.6, but does represent
> another set of security considerations that could lead to safety issues.
> More text on access control considerations for NMS may help.

I propose adding the following text to the respective sections.

Section 4.1 - Environmental Monitoring

Since many applications of environmental monitoring sensors are likely
to be in areas that are important to safety (flood monitoring, nuclear
radiation monitoring, etc.) it is important for management protocols
and network management systems (NMS) to ensure appropriate security
protections that ensure not only access control, integrity and
availability of data, but also provide appropriate mechanisms that can
deal with situations that might be categorized as emergencies or when
tampering with sensors/data might be detected.

Section 4.2 - Infrastructure Monitoring

Since infrastructure monitoring is closely related to ensuring safety,	
management protocols and systems must provide appropriate security	
protections to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of	
data.

Section 4.3 - Industrial Applications

Management protocols and NMSs must ensure appropriate access control
since different users of industrial control systems will have varying
levels of permissions.  E.g., while supervisors might be allowed to
change production parameters, they should not be allowed to modify the
functional configuration of devices like a technician should.  It is
also important to ensure integrity and availability of data since
malfunctions can potentially become safety issues.  This also implies
that management systems must be able to react to situations that may
pose dangers to worker safety.

Section 4.5 - Medical Applications

In both cases, however, it is crucial to protect the safety and
privacy of the people to which medical devices are attached. Security
precautions to protect access (authentication, encryption, integrity
protections, etc.) to such devices may be critical to safeguarding the
individual. The level of access granted to different users also may
need to be regulated. For example, an authorized surgeon or doctor
must be allowed to configure all necessary options on the devices,
however, a nurse or technician may only be allowed to retrieve data
that can assist in diagnosis. Even though the data collected by a
heart beat monitor might be protected, the pure fact that someone
carries such a device may need protection. As such, certain medical
appliances may not want to participate in discovery and
self-configuration protocols in order to remain invisible.

Section 4.6 - Building Automation

It is also important for a building automation NMS to take safety and
security into account.  Ensuring privacy and confidentiality of data,
such that unauthorized parties do not get access to it, is likely to
be important since users' individual behaviors could be potentially
understood via their settings.  Appropriate security considerations
for authorization and access control to the NMS is also important
since different users are likely to have varied levels of operational
permissions in the system.  E.g., while end users should be able to
control lighting systems, HVACs, etc., only qualified technicians
should be able to configure parameters that change the fundamental
operation of a device.  It is also important for devices and the NMS
to be able to detect and report any tampering they might detect, since
these could lead to potential user safety concerns, e.g., if sensors
controlling air quality are tampered with such that the levels of
Carbon Monoxide become life threatening.  This implies that a NMS
should also be able to deal with and appropriately prioritize
situations that might potentially lead to safety concerns.

Section 4.8 - Transport Applications

Since transport applications of the constrained devices and networks
deal with automotive vehicles, malfunctions and misuse can potentially
lead to safety concerns as well.  As such, besides access control,
privacy of user data and timeliness management systems should also be
able to detect situations that are potentially hazardous to safety.
Some of these situations could be automatically mitigated, e.g.,
traffic lights with incorrect timing, but others might require human
intervention, e.g., failed traffic lights.  The management system
should take appropriate actions in these situations.  Maintaining data
confidentiality and integrity is also an important security aspect of
a management system since tampering (or malfunction) can also lead to
potentially dangerous situations.



Hopefully this text is enough to resolve these issues.

Regards,
Anuj