Re: [OPSEC] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-08: (with COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 15 July 2021 20:04 UTC

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Date: Thu, 15 Jul 2021 13:03:56 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Fernando Gont <fernando.gont@edgeuno.com>
Cc: "ek.ietf@gmail.com" <ek.ietf@gmail.com>, "opsec@ietf.org" <opsec@ietf.org>, "opsec-chairs@ietf.org" <opsec-chairs@ietf.org>, "iesg@ietf.org" <iesg@ietf.org>, "draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering@ietf.org" <draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [OPSEC] Erik Kline's No Objection on draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-eh-filtering-08: (with COMMENT)
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Hi Fernando,

On Thu, Jul 08, 2021 at 03:48:05AM +0000, Fernando Gont wrote:
> Hello, Ben,
> 
> On Wed, 2021-07-07 at 19:00 -0700, Benjamin Kaduk wrote:
> > On Wed, Jun 30, 2021 at 10:03:48PM -0700, Erik Kline via Datatracker
> > wrote:
> > > [S4.3.9.4] [comment]
> > > 
> > > * It seems fairly clear from RFC 5570 Security Considerations that
> > > a
> > >   CALIPSO option is best protected with an AH, and in such cases
> > > stripping
> > >   the CALIPSO option would cause the packet to fail validation at
> > > the
> > >   (suitably configured) destination.
> > > 
> > >   Similarly, it might be good to note in S4.3.9.5 that if an AH is
> > > present
> > >   presumably the advice from S3.4.5.5 applies.
> > 
> > Probably not very relevant here, but the current IPSECME advice is to
> > use
> > ESP with null encryption rather than AH.
> 
> A pointer might be worth including. What document and section should we
> be referencing here?

It's not perfect, but
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8221#section-5 does include:

   ENCR_NULL status was set to MUST in [RFC7321] and remains a MUST to
   enable the use of ESP with only authentication, which is preferred
   over AH due to NAT traversal.  ENCR_NULL is expected to remain MUST
   by protocol requirements.

-Ben