Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-rtc-security-00
Enrico Marocco <enrico.marocco@telecomitalia.it> Tue, 14 April 2009 12:43 UTC
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Date: Tue, 14 Apr 2009 14:44:27 +0200
From: Enrico Marocco <enrico.marocco@telecomitalia.it>
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To: Song Haibin <melodysong@huawei.com>
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Subject: Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-rtc-security-00
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Thanks for an accurate review, Haibin, we'll integrate your comments in the next version of the draft. A few notes inline. Song Haibin wrote: > 1. In Section 1, paragraph 1, "P2P networks are now also being used for > applications such as Voice over IP (VoIP) [SKYPE] [Singh] and television > [JOOST] [COOLSTREAM]." > > [Haibin] As far as I know, Joost has just changed its basic P2P system > architecture and turned to client/server architecture. It’s better to > remove this reference. Yes, indeed, probably now PPLive is a better example of P2P systems for realtime content delivery. > 2. Section 2.1 Incentive of attacker > > [Haibin] I could give some additional common incentives of attackers. > For example, some attacks are motivated by the business competition or > for selling security products. E.g., I heard some firewall product > companies usually attack some company’s network, and tell them their > network is not safe, so that they could sell them firewalls. Attacks due > to competition are also common cases. These kinds of attacks may happen > to p2p overlays. While it is arguably a real issue in C/S scenarios, I'm not sure who, in a P2P system, could be the target customer of such security solutions. Maybe you are thinking of sort of a hybrid model, but the case of some company selling a security product for an application distributed by another company doesn't seem much realistic. OTOH I agree that competition could be a real incentive. > 5. In Section 5.1.2, Reactive identification, "In a file-sharing > application for example, after downloading content from a node, if the > peer observes that data does not match its original query it can > identify the corresponding node as malicious." > > [Haibin] It is hard to determine which node is the malicious node in > this context. But at least this content in this node can be marked with > “malicious”, or this node can be marked with “suspicious”. Identification of malicious peers is actually a very complex topic, subject itself of many possible attacks. The example in section 5.1.2, surely over-simplistic, has the only intent to pass to the reader a quick image of the reactive approach, but it is of course far from a real solution. > 7. In section 7.1.2 When to upgrade > > [Haibin] It lists some information to determine the peer load, e.g. > number of clients attached, bandwidth usage for DHT maintenance, memory > usage for DHT routing table. I hope p2psip diagnostics > (draft-ietf-p2psip-diagnostics) mechanisms can be used to collect the > listed corresponding information from the overlay. At the time of writing the p2psip-diagnostics work was still very early, but I agree that now it would be worth referenced here. -- Ciao, Enrico
- [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-rtc-s… Song Haibin
- Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-r… Enrico Marocco
- Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-r… Song Haibin
- Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-r… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [p2prg] Comments to draft-schulzrinne-p2prg-r… Emil Ivov