RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients
"Henry Sinnreich" <hsinnrei@adobe.com> Mon, 19 November 2007 15:56 UTC
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Subject: RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients
Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 07:56:11 -0800
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From: Henry Sinnreich <hsinnrei@adobe.com>
To: Spencer Dawkins <spencer@mcsr-labs.org>, p2psip@lists.ietf.org
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Spencer, Thanks for the question! The section is actually: "4.1.1. Public P2P VoIP Service Providers". As mentioned, why can encryption and signing of the software in the device or endpoint work only for a proprietary protocol like Skype and not for P2PSIP, even when the SW is OS? Henry -----Original Message----- From: Spencer Dawkins [mailto:spencer@mcsr-labs.org] Sent: Monday, November 19, 2007 9:22 AM To: p2psip@lists.ietf.org Subject: Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients >>>trustable nodes must have the software encrypted and signed by a >>>central authority >>How do you propose that other nodes determine whether a peer is >>running such software? >My assumption is the p2p overlay is run by an owner with a vested >interest of protecting the overlay, just like Skype does. I note that http://tools.ietf.org/wg/p2psip/draft-bryan-p2psip-app-scenarios-00.txt explicitly calls this application scenario out in Section 4.4.1 (and the associated attributes in Table 1). The authors of this draft would love to see some discussion of this particular scenario on-list, since it seems that some people are assuming this scenario while others are assuming other scenarios. And if we can't frame the discussion in a specific scenario, this turns into a "baby beauty contest" where everyone says "MY baby is the most beautiful"... Thanks, Spencer _______________________________________________ P2PSIP mailing list P2PSIP@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip _______________________________________________ P2PSIP mailing list P2PSIP@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
- [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Victor Pascual Ávila
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier David A. Bryan
- RE: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Brian Rosen
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Ali Fessi
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Salman Abdul Baset
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… RUBEN CUEVAS RUMIN
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henning Schulzrinne
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… JiangXingFeng
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- RE: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Jan Seedorf
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín