Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients
Rubén Cuevas Rumín <rcuevas@it.uc3m.es> Mon, 19 November 2007 16:13 UTC
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Date: Mon, 19 Nov 2007 17:14:02 +0100
From: Rubén Cuevas Rumín <rcuevas@it.uc3m.es>
Organization: Departamento Ingeniería Telemática. Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
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To: Henry Sinnreich <hsinnrei@adobe.com>
Subject: Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients
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Henry Sinnreich escribió: > Spencer, > > Thanks for the question! > The section is actually: "4.1.1. Public P2P VoIP Service Providers". > > As mentioned, why can encryption and signing of the software in the > device or endpoint work only for a proprietary protocol like Skype and > not for P2PSIP, even when the SW is OS? > In this case I agree with Eric. He possed some argument I support. I would like to add a new argument. We are trying to standarize a p2psip protocol. However, if latter we are going to allow every ISP or other company using their own p2psip overlay to encrypt and obfuscate the code we cannot assure if this code is or not compliant with the defined standard. Then the standard would not be anymore an standard but a set of rule to follow. And now imagine two different ISPs deploy their softwares and encrypt them and at some point the want to make inter-domain communications, if they are using different encryption schemes (and what would be worse, they have slightly modified the standard) how their clients are going to communicate?. I think encryption/obfuscation works for private solution as Skype, but IMO is an error consider this as part of a standard protocol. What do you think? Rubén. > Henry > > -----Original Message----- > From: Spencer Dawkins [mailto:spencer@mcsr-labs.org] > Sent: Monday, November 19, 2007 9:22 AM > To: p2psip@lists.ietf.org > Subject: Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients > > >>>> trustable nodes must have the software encrypted and signed by a >>>> central authority >>>> > > >>> How do you propose that other nodes determine whether a peer is >>> running such software? >>> > > >> My assumption is the p2p overlay is run by an owner with a vested >> interest of protecting the overlay, just like Skype does. >> > > I note that > http://tools.ietf.org/wg/p2psip/draft-bryan-p2psip-app-scenarios-00.txt > explicitly calls this application scenario out in Section 4.4.1 (and the > > associated attributes in Table 1). > > The authors of this draft would love to see some discussion of this > particular scenario on-list, since it seems that some people are > assuming > this scenario while others are assuming other scenarios. > > And if we can't frame the discussion in a specific scenario, this turns > into > a "baby beauty contest" where everyone says "MY baby is the most > beautiful"... > > Thanks, > > Spencer > > > > _______________________________________________ > P2PSIP mailing list > P2PSIP@ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip > > _______________________________________________ > P2PSIP mailing list > P2PSIP@ietf.org > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip > _______________________________________________ P2PSIP mailing list P2PSIP@ietf.org https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/p2psip
- [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Victor Pascual Ávila
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier David A. Bryan
- RE: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Brian Rosen
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Ali Fessi
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clients Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Salman Abdul Baset
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… RUBEN CUEVAS RUMIN
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henning Schulzrinne
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… JiangXingFeng
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Rubén Cuevas Rumín
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Spencer Dawkins
- RE: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Henry Sinnreich
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [P2PSIP] Abusive and trustable peers and clie… Marcus Leech
- RE: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Jan Seedorf
- Re: [P2PSIP] Identity vs Identifier Rubén Cuevas Rumín