Re: [Pana] IESG discussions on draft-ohba-pana-relay

["Alper Yegin" <[e-mail]>]

Carsten,

Section 6. Security Considerations talks about the threats, some of which
are already handled by the base EAP/PANA design. Other threats that are
relevant to introduction of the PRE, they are described and the PRE-PAA
security is pointed accordingly.

Alper




> -----Original Message-----
> From: Carsten Bormann [mailto:[e-mail]]
> Sent: Friday, June 24, 2011 11:52 AM
> To: Alper Yegin
> Cc: 'Jari Arkko'; 'Yoshihiro Ohba'; [e-mail]; draft-ohba-pana-
> [e-mail]; 'Stephen Farrell'
> Subject: Re: [Pana] IESG discussions on draft-ohba-pana-relay
> 
> On Jun 24, 2011, at 10:09, Alper Yegin wrote:
> 
> > PRE/PAA security is OPTIONAL since PANA messages are designed to be
> > used in untrusted networks, but if cryptographic mechanism is
> > supported, it SHOULD be IPsec. When the device characteristics
> preclude
> > support for IPsec, an alternative mechanism such as DTLS [REF], or
> > link-layer cryptographic security, etc. may be used instead. This
> section
> > describes how IPsec [RFC4301] can be used for securing the PANA relay
> > messages.
> 
> It would be useful to be very explicit what the objectives for this
> "PRE/PAA security" might be.
> Section 6 seems to suggest there is no real need for this at all (but
> then nebulously talks about "residual risks").
> So, unless we say what this is good for, it is hard to assess whether
> the "PRE/PAA security" is actually meeting those objectives.
> (E.g., if the purpose is DoS mitigation, a security scheme that is as
> susceptible to DoS attacks as the PAA itself, isn't that useful.)
> 
> Gruesse, Carsten