Re: [payload] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-payload-vp8-17: (with COMMENT)

"Ben Campbell" <ben@nostrum.com> Thu, 17 September 2015 04:04 UTC

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From: Ben Campbell <ben@nostrum.com>
To: Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2015 23:04:45 -0500
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Cc: payload-chairs@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, payload@ietf.org, draft-ietf-payload-vp8@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [payload] Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-payload-vp8-17: (with COMMENT)
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On 16 Sep 2015, at 21:24, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:

> Why is this a SHOULD:
> Applications SHOULD use one or more appropriate strong security
> mechanisms.
>
> Wouldn't it be more helpful to point out why you would use specific
> security mechanisms for security considerations?

Hi Kathleen,

That's part of the boilerplate for payload drafts. The idea is that the 
security requirements are specific to the application that uses RTP, not 
RTP itself or the related payload format. For example, WebRTC requires 
DTLS-SRTP. There's an open discussion on what should be required for 
point-to-point RTP sessions signaled via SIP (which I need to push 
forward.)

This is discussed further in RFCs 7201 and 7202.

Thanks!

Ben.